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Abstract
In a model of investment in product development in duopoly we study the implications of
diﬀerent costs of innovating and imitating for ﬁrm strategies and optimal IP protection, relating
these to the dynamic characteristics of a stochastic demand. A critical relative cost is identiﬁed
that determines whether strategic competition takes the form of attrition or preemption, with
industry value being maximized when ﬁrms neither stall nor hasten entry. Provided that
demand growth and volatility are suﬃciently low, as typically arises in mature industries, it is
socially desirable to provide innovators with complete protection (winner-take-all), implying
a preemption race. But when demand is rapidly expanding and highly unpredictable a social
optimum can involve a low level of protection, implying attrition, albeit with a positive lower
bound for the optimal level of imitation cost (winner-pays-some). Industry proﬁts increase if
ﬁrms can commit not to seek stronger IP protection once they have innovated, providing a
rationale for open standards. While buyouts have ambiguous welfare eﬀects, simple licensing
schemes are welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
When developing an invention into a commercial product requires signiﬁcant resources, only a few
ﬁrms may jockey for positions in an industry either as a ﬁrst-mover or as a second entrant. In these
circumstances the timing of product introductions is determined by investment strategies that are
driven by the relative costs of innovation and imitation and respond to such policy variables as the
strength of intellectual property (IP) rights, whose eﬀectiveness must hinge therefore on dynamic
characteristics of the ﬁnal product market.
In a model of innovation focusing on competing investments in the development of a new
product, we study the implications of diﬀerences in the costs of innovating and imitating for
the strategies of ﬁrms when their roles as an innovator or imitator are endogenous, in order to
characterize the regulator's choice of optimal IP protection level. By identifying the role played
by the drift and the volatility of demand in this context we are able to shed light on the timing
of innovative and imitative investment and its implications for welfare, so as to contribute a novel
perspective on the necessity of strong IP protection in certain types of markets.
A high degree of IP protection that induces a preemption race between ﬁrms is seen to consti-
tute a second-best from a welfare standpoint under general conditions that are satisﬁed in common
oligopoly models if demand growth and volatility are suﬃciently low, as typically occurs in mature
industries. When the level of these demand characteristics is suﬃciently low in fact, it is socially
desirable to provide innovators with complete protection and let strategic investment take the
form of a winner-take-all contest. Conversely, attrition arises if innovation has positive spillovers
for the imitating ﬁrm, and it is all the more likely when demand growth and volatility are high, a
case that corresponds to the circumstances most commonly associated with innovative industries.
Even then an optimal level of IP protection still sets a positive cost of imitating that we identify,
so that dynamic competition between ﬁrms should always be winner-pay-some in nature.
Speciﬁcally, we investigate the exercise of strategic growth options by two initially identical
ﬁrms contemplating the development of a product for a new market in which they are potential
horizontal competitors.1 Investment levels are ﬁxed and irreversible and product development oc-
curs in a context of uncertainty, as market demand evolves stochastically over time through a scale
parameter that follows a geometric Brownian motion.2 Both ﬁrms independently choose invest-
1Our focus on industries in which ﬁrms are horizontal competitors is therefore complementary to research on
cumulative innovation such as Green and Scotchmer [15].
2We thus focus on the eﬀect market uncertainty rather than R&D uncertainty on innovation incentives, the
latter having been extensively studied in the patent race literature (see e.g. Denicolò [6]).
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ment thresholds that determine the timing of their investment, and once performed investments
result in a perpetual proﬁt ﬂow whose magnitude at any moment depends on the number of active
ﬁrms. We thus study a real option game3 but depart from existing work by introducing an ex-post
asymmetry through the diﬀering ﬁxed costs of innovation and imitation that ﬁrms face. We do not
restrict the relative magnitude of these ﬁxed costs, so the model allows for either a broad level of
IP protection which implies a relatively high cost of imitation, or signiﬁcant spillovers that result
in a comparatively low cost of imitation.
Through the diﬀerence between the costs of innovating and imitating we parametrize ﬁrst- and
second-mover advantage in a parsimonious way, which allows us to nest in the same framework
two classic games of timing (the deterministic models of attrition and preemption of Hendricks et
al. [17] and Fudenberg and Tirole [11]) whose combination and formulation in the stochastic case
present several challenges (Thijssen et al. [34], Riedel and Steg [29]). In order to allow a tractable
welfare analysis of the eﬀect of the level of IP protection on ﬁrm investment incentives and in-
dustry outcomes, we consider a timing game in which the strategies of ﬁrms consist of investment
thresholds or hurdle rates that determine stochastic investment times, for which we provide a sim-
ple strategic form and characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in the investment threshold
choices of ﬁrms (in Section A.5 we complement the strategic form with a more technical discussion
of extended mixed strategies and a dynamic view of the investment game).
Our ﬁrst result relates equilibrium strategic investment to the relative costs of innovation and
imitation (Proposition 1), and we identify a critical level of imitation cost that determines whether
strategic competition between ﬁrms takes the form of attrition or preemption. For suﬃciently low
or high values of the cost of imitation, we ﬁnd that strategic competition between ﬁrms has the
form of a standard attrition or preemption game. A suﬃciently low imitation cost leads to a
situation of attrition as ﬁrms seek to enter second, delaying product introduction and inducing
more or less rapid imitation.4 Conversely a suﬃciently high imitation cost leads to a situation of
preemption as ﬁrms seek to enter ﬁrst, accelerating product introduction but generally delaying
imitation. For intermediate imitation cost values, strategic competition takes the form either of a
waiting game in which ﬁrm investment thresholds are continuously distributed over a disconnected
support, or of a preemption race in which an attrition phase may occur oﬀ the equilibrium path.
3Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [4] provide a thorough presentation of such games, in which ﬁrms balance
the value of retaining ﬂexibility in the face of uncertainty with the strategic incentive to invest early.
4Our model thus encompasses dynamics akin to those described by Scherer (1980, quoted in Fudenberg and
Tirole [11]) as each industry member holding back initiating its R&D eﬀort in the fear that rapid imitation by
others will be encouraged, more than wiping out its innovative proﬁts.
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Attrition occurs provided that innovation has positive spillovers, if product market competition
is suﬃciently weak, and market growth and volatility are suﬃciently high. This is because high
growth and volatility raise the option value of delaying investment, eventually compensating for
the lost monopoly proﬁt phase if the ﬁrm manages to enter second and imitate instead. A useful
additional result concerns the optimal balance between ﬁrst- and second-mover advantage from the
standpoint of the industry. Under both attrition and preemption, positional rents are dissipated
in equilibrium, so that expected industry value is maximized if the imitation cost attains a critical
level at which there is neither a race to preempt nor a war of attrition, as ﬁrms thus do not
compete for positional rents by unduly either rushing or waiting to innovate (Proposition 2).
Because the model has a tractable equilibrium solution we are able to study the choice of
socially optimal IP protection levels by a regulator who adjusts the cost incurred when imitating an
innovation. The welfare trade-oﬀs associated with raising imitation cost are largely intuitive. Aside
from the eﬀect on industry proﬁt described above, a higher imitation cost makes the investment
game more preemptive, accelerating innovation but also increasing the lag before imitation occurs
with corresponding implications for consumer surplus. Viewed as a function of the imitation
cost chosen by the regulator, social welfare generally has local maxima in both the attrition
and preemption ranges, and either type of stationary point may constitute a global maximum
(Proposition 3). We are able to identify a lower bound on the socially optimal imitation cost as well
as to characterize the optimal imitation cost under preemption. We further identify conditions on
economic primitives for one form or another of dynamic competition to be optimal: social welfare
maximization involves attrition if the lack of competition is very damaging for consumers (like
when the monopoly operator practices perfect price discrimination), and preemption is optimal
when the introduction of additional competition does not bring much to consumers (for example,
when there is product market collusion under duopoly).
It is challenging to draw more general conclusions regarding optimal IP levels, but we are able
to show in our model that, provided that the static entry incentive is socially excessive  as occurs
in the presence of a business-stealing eﬀect  preemption is optimal when market growth and
volatility are suﬃciently low (Proposition 4). In a model of irreversible investment these market
characteristics are associated with a greater discounting parameter so this result seems intuitive
at ﬁrst glance, since the adverse eﬀect of higher imitation cost on welfare primarily stems from the
ensuing delay in imitation which clearly decreases with discounting. However the welfare realized
under attrition does not have a closed-form expression, and it is only by identifying an upper bound
on this welfare expression that we are able to establish our result. Moreover, when the optimal
imitation cost level induces preemption, the closed form expression for the (second-best) optimal
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imitation cost that we obtain leads us to ascertain when the optimal form of competition for an
industry is to set an arbitrarily high (winner-take-all) cost of imitation. Our model thus provides
an argument for strong IP rights in certain industries, which is grounded in speciﬁc demand
characteristics (low growth and uncertainty). In addition, we are able to identify a positive lower
bound for the optimal level of imitation cost, implying that free imitation is always socially costly
(winner-pay-some).
Finally, we discuss several extensions of the investment game by incorporating a broader set
of ﬁrm decisions. First we endogenize the cost of imitation by allowing the innovator to pursue
patent protection more aggressively or to make reverse engineering of its product more diﬃcult,
and ﬁnd that a higher baseline cost of imitation reduces the eﬀort exerted by innovators to raise
entry barriers.5 In addition, ﬁrms are shown to gain from coordinating ex-ante not to introduce
subsequent complexity, a policy we refer to as an open standard (Proposition 5). We also discuss
contracting between innovator and imitator that can take the form either of a buyout or of a
license agreement, and show that eﬃciency always increases in the latter case (Proposition 6).
Our paper is related to early research on innovation incentives, which addresses the issue of
optimal IP protection. Among the inﬂuential articles in this literature, Klemperer [23] and Gilbert
and Shapiro [13] study the socially optimal trade-oﬀ between patent length and breadth for a given
discounted present value to the innovator, and Gallini [12] introduces a cost of imitation that the
regulator may control as a third patent instrument. We similarly emphasize the role of the cost
of inventing around and determine an optimal level of patent breadth, but in contrast with these
earlier approaches we allow for the possibility that ﬁrms in imperfectly competitive industries may
wait to invest rather than developing a new product right when its net present value is positive,
and derive the consequences of optimal investment timing for welfare. Closer to our work is
Denicolò [6]'s model of optimal IP protection in a patent race, as we also formalize innovation
and imitation as the outcome of a non-cooperative interaction that precedes market competition,
though in contrast to his model we allow for second-mover advantage and possible attrition, which
we show is likely to arise in industries with high growth and volatility.
Our analysis relates to several other papers that develop a welfare comparison across two
alternative policy regimes, namely a strict winner-take-all regime where only the ﬁrst ﬁrm to
innovate receives a patent, and a more permissive winner-take-most regime where late investors
are allowed to compete with the ﬁrst before its patent expires. In La Manna, Macleod, and de
Meza [24] ﬁrms spend a ﬁxed initial amount in R&D that determines a probability of inventing
5This extension also has implications for a patent system that allows ﬁrms to self-select protection levels, as
proposed by Encaoua et al. [9], so as to endogenously raise the investment cost of follower ﬁrms.
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at a future date. Simple cost and demand conditions, such as constant returns to scale and
a linear demand, are identiﬁed for the permissive regime to be welfare superior. Henry [18]
introduces a mechanism whereby a late inventor can share the patent with the innovator within
a given time period. When adjusted, together with other policy instruments, this mechanism is
socially beneﬁcial under mild conditions, notably with a linear demand and quantity competition.
However, in a model where ﬁrms incur a ﬂow cost, in Denicolò and Franzoni [7] it is the strict
patent regime that is found to be optimal in broad set of circumstances, in particular when demand
is linear, product market competition is weak, and duplication ﬂow costs are large. Our approach
is consistent with these contributions, although we do not compare discrete policy regimes and
rather seek to characterize the optimal degree of IP protection in a continuous measure of the
relative imitation cost, with the winner-take-all regime occurring as a limit case. Moreover, the
model of investment under uncertainty allows us to connect optimal protection with measurable
demand characteristics that were not considered in this stream of literature. Accordingly, our
results depart from the comparison of contrasted policy regimes and point rather to adapting IP
protection to measurable properties of the dynamics of markets.
Our paper is also close to studies of the eﬀect on investment decisions of informational spillovers
which can imply a second-mover advantage. Katz and Shapiro [22] is an early model in which a ﬁrm
beneﬁts from its rival's innovative activity through post-development dissemination of knowledge
in a deterministic framework. Hoppe [21] allows for uncertainty regarding the success of new
technology adoption whereas in Thijssen et al. [33] information regarding the value of a project
arrives continuously over time, and the second investor faces an identical cost but learns about
a project's true proﬁtability from the ﬁrst. Femminis and Martini [10] allow for a disclosure
lag of random duration before the follower receives the information. In all of these models both
preemption and attrition can occur as in ours, depending on the level of spillovers, but aside from
Thijssen et al., all focus on pure strategy equilibria, whereas we characterize the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium  a reasonable methodological choice when ﬁrms are assumed to be ex-ante
symmetric, which provides what seems to us to be a more intuitive characterization of socially
optimal IP protection.
Finally, similar licensing and reverse engineering decisions to those that we examine in our
ﬁnal extensions are found in Mukherjee and Pennings [27] and Henry and Ruiz-Aliseda [19], albeit
once the roles of ﬁrms as incumbents or potential entrants have been determined, so that unlike
in our approach their focus is on inherently asymmetric ﬁrms.
In Section 2 we describe the pharmaceutical sector as a natural example to examine in light of
our analysis. Section 3 presents our model and characterizes the symmetric equilibrium. Section
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4 studies welfare when a regulator uses an instrument such as breadth of IP protection to regulate
the cost of imitation. In Section 5 two extensions are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 An example: contrasted market conditions in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry
The theoretical model that we develop points towards a policy prescription that consists in tailoring
IP protection to general industry or market segment characteristics. The biopharmaceutical sector,
in which R&D spending and innovation play a critical role, provides a natural industry example
to examine in light of our analysis, as signiﬁcant steps have already been taken in order to adjust
IP protection in response to identiﬁable categories of market conditions. For instance for orphan
drugs and rare disease development, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has enacted an
enhanced form of IP protection (Orphan Drug Exclusivity) together with a tax credit that lowers
the costs of clinical trials (Grabowski et al. [14]). Our analysis oﬀers theoretical support to
regulatory measures of this kind that adapt the relative cost of innovation and imitation to a
market's speciﬁc characteristics, and which could also involve patent narrowing in case of high
demand growth and volatility.
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms face market conditions that impact product introductions and that can
vary signiﬁcantly across geographic areas. In low- and middle-income countries, economic and
demographic drivers often imply high demand growth, but political instability can also result in
less demand predictability than in high-income economies, and thus discourage the industry from
introducing new treatments or preventives. Managers of big pharmaceutical companies are very
aware of such market characteristics, and emphasize that although pharmaceutical markets in
key emerging economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, are expanding at rates of more than 12
percent per year (...) uncertain demand, and political and economic instability in some countries
have deterred private investors for decades (Witty [36], pp. 118 and 124).
In such circumstances, initiatives have been taken that alter the relative cost of imitation in
order to encourage generic competition by local producers. For example, in order to increase
access to antiretroviral drugs to treat HIV infection in the developing world, over the last decades
political mobilization has facilitated the production of generic versions of the medicines patented
in developed countries (Hoen et al. [20]). However, any adjustment in the IP protection regime
also modiﬁes innovation incentives, and absent a theoretical reﬂection as conducted in the present
paper it is not clear how such changes should relate to demand characteristics in order for ﬁrms'
7
decisions to result in greater social value. Our results show that when demand is rapidly expanding
and highly uncertain, although shifting to weaker IP protection may reduce expected industry
value (Corollary 2 and Proposition 2) it has the potential to improve social welfare, provided that
patents are not abolished altogether and thus imitation costs are not too low (Proposition 3), and
that it is in more mature markets such as those of high-income economies that strong IP protection
should be upheld.
Within this same industry, conditions of imitation for drugs strongly diﬀer from those for
vaccines.6 Pharmaceutical ﬁrms rely on intellectual property rights in order to increase the costs
of imitators for new drugs which otherwise could be copied more easily than products whose
production processes can be kept secret, or for which the time and relative expense needed to copy
the invention are much higher (Scherer and Watal [31], p. 4). If such patent protection is not
available, a generic product can be introduced at a much lower ﬁxed cost than incurred by the
branded product supplier. However, this ease of imitation is not found in the case of vaccines,
which are made from living micro-organisms, and unlike drugs are not easily reverse-engineered,
as the greatest challenges often lie in details of production processes that cannot be inferred from
the ﬁnal product, implying that there is technically no such thing as a generic vaccine (Wilson
[35], p. 13).
The regulatory implication is that the imitating ﬁrm must reinvest in clinical trials which can
involve subjects in the tens of thousands, and in complex manufacturing facilities that comply with
demanding regulatory standards, before applying for approval of the product by the regulator. The
ﬁxed cost that must be incurred by a new entrant for the delivery of a follow-on vaccine can thus
be prohibitively high, which is consistent with less systematic reliance on patenting by established
ﬁrms than in the drugs segment. We return to this issue in light of the theoretical model in Section
5.1, where the imitation cost is assumed to depend on the innovator's choice of protection level.
3 A model of the timing of new product development in duopoly
This section describes our model of strategic investment in product development that reﬂects the
characteristic features of innovation and imitation identiﬁed in the introduction and illustrated in
the industry example above. Assumptions regarding industry structure are presented in Section
6Another salient characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry is the R&D uncertainty that is introduced by
late-stage clinical trials regarding the outcome of a research project, most often after signiﬁcant costs have already
been sunk, but the focus of our model is on market uncertainty which is also important (see footnote 2).
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3.1, those regarding ﬁrm conduct and the investment game are presented in Section 3.2, and
equilibrium is characterized in Section 3.3.
3.1 Industry structure
Two identical ﬁrms seek to enter a market by introducing their version of a novel product. Orga-
nizational constraints preclude a ﬁrm from selling two variants of the product and technological or
regulatory barriers shield both ﬁrms from further entry. Development of the new product involves
an irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty regarding future demand levels.
The introduction of the product generates a baseline proﬁt ﬂow piM when a single ﬁrm i, i ∈
{1, 2} is active and piD when both are, with 0 < piD < piM . Flow proﬁt at time t takes the form
piMYt or piDYt where the multiplicative component Yt is a measure of market size and is assumed
to follow a geometric Brownian motion, dYt = αYtdt+σYtdZt where (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener
process, α is the drift of the process and the volatility parameter σ > 0 reﬂects the notion that
demand for a new product evolves in a context of uncertainty. Proﬁt ﬂows instantaneously and
with certainty once investment has occurred. Firms have a common and constant discount rate
assumed to be large enough that the investment problem is economically meaningful (r > α).
Introducing the new product involves a positive irrecuperable ﬁxed cost I for the the ﬁrst
ﬁrm that invests to serve demand, i.e. for the innovator. If its rival has innovated, a ﬁrm can
invest afterwards (even immediately) as a second entrant, i.e. as an imitator, and introducing the
imitative product also involves a ﬁxed cost K which is also irrecuperable. The imitator's ﬁxed cost
is allowed to be either higher or lower than the innovator's, and we allow for the extreme cases of
costless or arbitrarily costly imitation (K = 0 or K =∞). The cost of imitation typically includes
various standard setup costs associated with bringing a product to market such as dedicated plant
and equipment, marketing expenditures, and so forth, as well as the cost of developing the ﬁrm's
version of the new product. If the second ﬁrm can develop the same product independently,
imitation should be no more expensive than innovation in the absence of IP, and even cost strictly
less to the extent that there are knowledge spillovers (K ≤ I). When IP protection is suﬃciently
strong however, imitators must invent around any patents held by the innovator and the second
mover can incur higher entry costs than the leader (K > I).7
7Other circumstances can lead to asymmetric ﬁxed costs for initially identical ﬁrms. For example, if developing
the new product involves an input in scarce supply, the imitator typically face a higher cost. Alternatively, Billette
de Villemeur et al. [2] show that if the cost of investment is determined endogenously by a monopoly input supplier,
the input price is endogenously discounted for the ﬁrst ﬁrm that invests.
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3.2 Firm strategies and payoﬀs
Firms play a game of timing whose normal form is studied in this section for simplicity of expo-
sition. This framework provides enough structure to derive the welfare results in Section 4 and
adequately reﬂects economic behavior so long as players do not make empty threats. We verify
that this is indeed the case by developing a dynamic view of the same game in which players use
extended mixed strategies as per Fudenberg and Tirole [11] in the appendix. This dynamic view
does not pose any novel diﬃculties provided that the ﬁrms invest at the ﬁrst-hitting times of the
stochastic process, but it is somewhat lengthy to develop and interested readers may therefore
refer to Section A.5.
Each ﬁrm chooses an investment threshold that triggers its investment when it is reached for the
ﬁrst time and in the absence of rival investment, but which it is free to revise if rival investment
occurs. Each ﬁrm's investment behavior is therefore conditioned on the dynamic evolution of
the market but open-loop with respect to any rival move until an investment occurs.8 Once an
investment occurs, any remaining ﬁrm may either respond by investing immediately or revise its
strategy in the continuation phase which is a single-ﬁrm decision problem. Industry dynamics
thus typically consist of a period of inaction before either ﬁrm has entered and over which the
main strategic interaction between the ﬁrms unfolds, followed by a possible monopoly phase and
ﬁnally a duopoly phase once both ﬁrms have entered.
It is assumed that Y0 ≤ (r − α) I/piM , so that the demand level when the game begins is
suﬃciently small for ﬁrms to prefer delaying investment. The strategy of ﬁrm i, i = 1, 2, con-
sists of an entry threshold Yi ∈ [Y0,∞) that triggers investment when it is reached for the ﬁrst
time, absent prior rival entry. Investment thresholds determine the roles of ﬁrms as innovator or
imitator and the (stochastic) moment at which the product is initially introduced, and once rival
investment (innovation) has occurred any remaining ﬁrm is able to revise its investment threshold
in a continuation (imitation) phase. The strategies Yi determine a stochastic time at which the
ﬁrm plans to invest, which is a ﬁrst hitting time τ (Yi) := inf {t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ Yi }.
If investment by one of the ﬁrms occurs at a value of the scale parameter Yt = y, the optimal
policy of any ﬁrm that has not yet entered is to invest when the market size has reached an optimal
threshold, denoted YF . Standard arguments (see Section A.1) establish that the continuation
payoﬀ of such a (follower) ﬁrm at a given time t is
C (y) =
{
ACy
β , y < YF
piD
r−αy −K , y ≥ YF
(1)
8This diﬀerence with Reinganum [28]'s notion of open-loop strategies plays a key role in the investment game.
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where β is shorthand for the function of parameters
β (α, σ, r) :=
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
, (2)
YF := (β (r − α)K) / ((β − 1)piD) is the optimal investment threshold of a ﬁrm that earns a
duopoly proﬁt stream upon entry and AC := β
βpiβD/ (β − 1)β−1 (r − α)βKβ−1. The function in
(2) is a standard expression in models of investment under uncertainty and satisﬁes β > 1 and
∂β/∂α, ∂β/∂σ < 0.9
Given the starting value of the demand parameter, if initial investment occurs at a threshold
Y ≥ y and any investment in the continuation phase occurs at the threshold max {Y, YF }, the
expected payoﬀ of a leader (or innovator) at time t = 0 is
L (Y ) = Ey
(∫ τ(max{Y,YF })
τ(Y )
piMYse
−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I +
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,YF })
piDYse
−rsds
)
=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − piM − piD
r − α
yβ
[max {Y, YF }]β−1
(3)
(see Section A.2 for derivations). The ﬁrst summand in (3) corresponds to the discounted value of
perpetual monopoly proﬁts for a ﬁrm that invests at the threshold Y and the second is a correction
term corresponding to the reduction in proﬁt ﬂow stemming from the rival's anticipated entry.
Given that innovation occurs at the threshold Y , the payoﬀ to any remaining ﬁrm from becoming
a follower at the moment that Y is ﬁrst reached is
F (Y ) = C (max {Y, YF })
(
y
max {Y, YF }
)β
. (4)
If both ﬁrms invest at the same moment the cost of investment is assumed to be I for each. This
may reﬂect either a legal tolerance for independent discovery, or a lag for information spillovers
to occur that we do not model explicitly.10 The initial expected payoﬀ to ﬁrms is then
M (Y ) = Ey
(∫ ∞
τ(Y )
piDYse
−rsds
)
=
(
piD
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β
. (5)
9A standard result regarding β is that for any Y ≥ y, the expected discounted value of a monetary unit received
when the process ﬁrst hits the threshold Y is Eye−rτ(Y ) = (y/Y ). As volatility decreases this discounted value
converges to the standard deterministic continuous time discount term, i.e. limσ→0 (y/Y )
β = e−rτ(Y ).
10An alternative assumption would be that IP protection and spillovers are determined randomly when invest-
ments are simultaneous so the expected ﬁxed cost at the moment of investment is (I +K)/2. In this case the ﬁrst
intersection of L and M is then no longer at YF rendering the algebraic expressions more complex, but the general
conﬁguration of payoﬀs and equilibrium upon which our results are based is similar.
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YL
F
L L,M
YF YS
E(V )
F (YF )
Figure 1: Attrition, K ≤ K˜, YS is a global maximum of the leader payoﬀ, innovation thresholds
are distributed over [YS ,∞), and imitation occurs immediately after.
YL
F
L
L,M
YFYS′ YS
F (YF )
E(V )
Figure 2: Attrition, K˜ < K < K̂, YS is a global maximum of the leader payoﬀ, innovation
thresholds are distributed over [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞), imitation occurs either at YF if the innovation
threshold is in [YL, YS′ ], or immediately otherwise.
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YL
E(V ) F
L
L,M
YFYP YP ′
Figure 3: Preemption, K̂ < K < I, innovation occurs at YP and imitation at YF . There is war
of attrition oﬀ the equilibrium path (over (YP ′ ,∞)).
YL
E(V )
F
L(YL)
L
YFYP
Figure 4: Preemption, K ≥ I, innovation occurs at YP and imitation at YF . The dotted curve
represents F (Y ) whereas the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrms is equal to the concentrated follower payoﬀ
F (YF ) (here with K = I).
The behavior of L,F and M for diﬀerent values of K determines the nature of the investment
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game. There exist three critical levels of the imitation cost, K˜ < K̂ < I,11 that determine four
typical payoﬀ conﬁgurations which are represented in Figures 1− 4.
For K < K˜ (Figure 1),12 F > L for all Y ≥ y and L has a global maximum at YS :=
(β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD). For K˜ < K < K̂ (Figure 2), F > L for all Y ≥ y but L has a global
maximum at YL := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ). Note also that L is not monotonic to the right
of its global maximum in this case. For K̂ < K < I (Figure 3), F < L over an interval denoted
(YP , YP ′) that includes YL. Finally, for K > I (Figure 4), F < L for all Y ≥ y.
Although the speciﬁc relationships between the payoﬀs are complex there is a broad intuition
underlying these the ﬁgures. Beginning with an extremely low cost of imitation (K = 0), the
payoﬀ to following is globally higher than that of leading (F > L). Raising the level of K then
increases the follower investment threshold YF and shifts F downward, but conversely this higher
investment threshold lengthens the monopoly phase and raises the payoﬀ to leading before follower
investment occurs, shifting L upward over the range (y, YF ). Ultimately if the cost of imitation
becomes large enough (K > I) it is the payoﬀ to leading that is globally higher than that of
following (F < L).
A last element of structure must be introduced before the payoﬀs and the investment game
can be fully described. It is well-known that in preemption games, ﬁrms face a coordination
problem if both seek to invest at the same threshold when it would be optimal for only one to
do so, i.e. if at some Y1 = Y2 = Y , L (Y ) ≥ F (Y ) and F (Y ) > M (Y ). A standard solution
proposed by Fudenberg and Tirole [11] is for players to use augmented mixed strategies that
reﬂect the coordination that arises in a discrete-time game and which is not captured directly
in a continuous time model. For simplicity we proceed somewhat diﬀerently and introduce a
speciﬁc tie-breaking rule to determine investment outcomes in such cases, leaving the formulation
of extended mixed strategies for the appendix. Following Thijssen [32], the tie-breaking rule is
chosen so that payoﬀs are consistent with those that obtain with augmented mixed strategies by
imposing rent equalization.
That is to say, if ﬁrms face such a coordination problem at the threshold Y the probability that
either ﬁrm invests ﬁrst (as a leader), p, is chosen so as to solve pL (Y )+pF (Y )+(1− 2p)M(Y ) =
11See Section A.2.3 for a derivation of the critical values K˜ =
(
β ((piM/piD)− 1) /
(
(piM/piD)
β − 1
))1/(β−1)
I and
K̂ =
(
(1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD)β
)1/(β−1)
I.
12Figure 1 is drawn assuming K > (piD/piM )I. Below this value, YF < YL and F is decreasing over (y,∞) but
the key properties described in the text are unaltered.
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F (Y ) leaving ﬁrms indiﬀerent between investing at that threshold and a subsequent follower role.
This yields
p (Y ) =
{
F (Y )−M(Y )
L(Y )+F (Y )−2M(Y ) if L (Y ) ≥ F (Y )
0 if L (Y ) < F (Y )
, (6)
and accordingly 1− 2p (Yi;K) is the probability that a mistaken simultaneous investment occurs.
On the basis of these elements the initial payoﬀ to ﬁrm i from investing at the threshold Yi if
the other ﬁrm invests at Yj is
V (Yi, Yj) =

L (Yi) if Yi < Yj
p (Yi)L (Yi) + p (Yi)F (Yi) + (1− 2p (Yi))M (Yi) if Yi = Yj
F (Yj) if Yi > Yj
(7)
and the investment game is represented by the normal form ({1, 2} , [y,∞)× [y,∞) , (V, V )).
3.3 Equilibrium
The investment game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium involving either pure or mixed
strategies. The resulting representation of equilibrium investment behavior is therefore consistent
with the seminal approaches of Fudenberg and Tirole [11] and Hendricks et al. [17] to preemption
and attrition. In attrition games, authors have sometimes studied (pure strategy) asymmetric
equilibria.13 This is appropriate, for example, if the same entry game is played in several in-
dependent markets and pre-play communication enables coordination between ﬁrms, but we do
not allow here for such a possibility. As ﬁrms are taken to be initially symmetric, it also seems
natural to suppose that initial investment behavior should be symmetric as well. Moreover the
equilibrium that we characterize involves a smooth dependence of outcomes on imitation cost that
is of compelling simplicity.
To get an intuitive sense of the nature of the investment game for diﬀerent levels of the imitation
cost, it is useful to refer again to Figures 1−4. For low enough levels of K (Figure 1, K ≤ K˜), the
leader payoﬀ L (Y ) lies below the follower payoﬀ F (Y ) for all Y ≥ y so ﬁrms prefer to follow, a
situation of attrition. Investing ﬁrst at any threshold Yi < YS is dominated by investing at YS , and
from that threshold onward L (Y ) is decreasing as in the standard war of attrition. For moderately
low levels of K (Figure 2, K˜ < K < K̂), the leader payoﬀ is globally lower than the follower payoﬀ
so that ﬁrms also play a waiting game. Since YL is a global maximum of L (Y ), investing at YS
13For instance Katz and Shapiro [22] and Hoppe [21] proceed this way.
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does not dominate lower thresholds, and in particular thresholds in [YL, YS′ ]. Firms therefore
engage in a nonstandard form of attrition, with investment thresholds continuously distributed
over the range [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞) where L (Y ) is decreasing. For high levels of the imitation cost
(Figure 3, K̂ < K < I and Figure 4, I ≤ K), there exists a range of thresholds below YF for which
the leader payoﬀ L (Y ) lies above the follower payoﬀ F (Y ) for all Y ≥ y so ﬁrms prefer to lead, a
situation of preemption. Initial investment then occurs at the preemption threshold YP , which is
deﬁned as the lowest threshold at which ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between leading and following (it is
the lower root of the condition L (Y ) = F (Y )). If the imitation cost is moderately high (Figure
3) the preemption game is nonstandard in that ﬁrms engage in a waiting game oﬀ the equilibrium
path if the threshold YP ′ is reached and no ﬁrm has yet invested, whereas with a higher imitation
cost (Figure 4) is a standard preemption case in which the leader payoﬀ never drops below the
follower payoﬀ to the left of YF .
The proposition below states these ideas formally and also separately identiﬁes the pivotal case
K = K̂ at which there is neither a ﬁrst-mover advantage nor a second-mover advantage in the
sense that L (YL) = F (YF )), which plays a central role in the welfare analysis of the next section.
Proposition 1 In the symmetric equilibrium of the duopoly investment game,
(i) if the cost of imitation is low (K < K̂) ﬁrms play a game of attrition. Equilibrium is in mixed
strategies with innovation thresholds distributed continuously over [YS ,∞) if K ≤ K˜ and over a
disconnected support [YL, YS′ ]∪ [YS ,∞) if K˜ < K < K̂. In the former case imitation is immediate
whereas in the latter it occurs with lag at the threshold YF with positive probability;
(ii) if the cost of imitation is high (K > K̂) ﬁrms play a game of preemption. Equilibrium is in
pure strategies at the innovation threshold YP , and imitation occurs at the threshold YF ;
(iii) at the critical imitation cost K̂ ﬁrms neither wait nor race to enter. Equilibrium is in pure
strategies at the innovation threshold YL, and imitation occurs at the threshold YF .
In the symmetric equilibrium positive rent dissipation occurs whenever the ﬁrms play a non-
degenerate timing game (when K 6= K̂). In an attrition regime, the rents of imitation that accrue
to a follower are dissipated in expectation because ﬁrms wait before investing, earning the relevant
leader payoﬀ L (YL) or L (YS) depending on the level of K. In a preemption regime, the rents to
a leader from innovation are dissipated as ﬁrms race to enter early, earning F (YF ). The expected
value of ﬁrms in the investment game therefore has a simple characterization. This is stated in
the following corollary, where the only diﬃculty stems from the fact that either YS or YL may
represent a globally maximum of L depending on the value of K.
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Corollary 1 In a symmetric equilibrium the duopoly investment game the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrms
are min {F (YF ) ,max {L (YL) , L (YS)}}.
Because the nature of the interaction between ﬁrms is determined by the level of the mitation
cost K relative to the critical imitation cost K̂, is it useful to have some sensitivity results with
respect to the intensity of competition in the product market (piM/piD) and parameters of the
demand process (α and σ).
Corollary 2 The more intense product market competition is and the lower demand growth and
volatility, the more likely it is that preemption occurs, and conversely for attrition
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
< 0,
∂K̂
∂α
,
∂K̂
∂σ
> 0.
To provide intuition for some of the latter comparative statics recall that the process Yt evolves
stochastically and that there is an option value for ﬁrms to wait before investing that is positively
related to drift and volatility. Provided that there is an inherent advantage to imitation (K < I),
for some parameter values and in particular for large enough levels of volatility (such thatK < K̂),
this option value outweighs any preemptive motive to secure monopoly rents. A similar reasoning
holds if the drift in demand is suﬃciently high. That is to say, an attrition regime is more likely
in industries with greater trend growth and demand volatility. This observation is particularly
noteworthy because it provides a countervailing force to several mechanisms that are highlighted
in the rest of the paper. As the next sections show, institutional conditions such as IP protection
and ﬁrm choices regarding both technology and licensing generally serve to make market entry
regimes more preemptive and attrition relatively more rare. One would therefore expect attrition
to seldom occur except in those industries with a signiﬁcant enough degree of demand growth or
demand uncertainty.
4 Imitation cost, industry proﬁt, and welfare
The preceding section highlighted the role of the ﬁxed cost of imitation in determining the na-
ture of strategic competition and the equilibrium pattern of entry in an industry, and ultimately
consumer surplus and welfare levels. This imitation cost is driven by several factors including
technological conditions and the level of IP protection. It thus varies from industry to industry
and can be inﬂuenced ex-ante by regulators, typically through a choice of patent breadth. These
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considerations raise the question of determining what may be socially desirable levels of imitation
cost. At ﬁrst glance this question appears to involve a simple trade-oﬀ since a higher imitation
cost is wasteful but hastens innovator entry. However diﬀerent eﬀects arise with regard to the
timing of imitator entry in the preemption and attrition regimes that need to be examined more
carefully.
This section therefore studies the eﬀect of K on equilibrium strategies and outcomes. In order
to express the social welfare function more compactly we introduce some further notation. Let
YI = min {Y1, Y2} denote the threshold at which innovation occurs, so that in equilibrium by
Proposition 1 YI = Y˜A, YL or YP depending on the level of K and where the random threshold
Y˜A in the attrition regime is distributed according to the density G∧ (Y ;K) = 1− (1−G· (Y ))2,
G· = Ga or Gb being the relevant equilibrium distribution of innovation thresholds (these are
derived in Section A.3).
4.1 Industry eﬀects
A useful preliminary step before conducting the welfare analysis is to characterize the eﬀect of
K on industry performance, which allows us to derive an intermediate result regarding industry
value. We begin by relating imitation cost to ﬁrst- and second-mover advantage, and industry
proﬁtability.
A ﬁrst observation that emerges from the model is that lower imitation cost is a necessary, but
not a suﬃcient condition for second mover advantage. Too see why this is, consider an industry
in which innovating and imitating ﬁrms have identical ﬁxed costs. There is an inherent ﬁrst-
mover advantage for the innovating ﬁrm that stems from the monopoly phase that it enjoys over
the range of thresholds (YL, YF ), and the degree of ﬁrst-mover advantage in such an industry is
determined by the relative importance of parameters like the relative monopoly rent (piM/piD).
In order for a second-mover advantage to arise in an industry, it must be that the relative cost
of imitation (K/I) in the input market is suﬃciently low to compensate a ﬁrm for forgoing the
period of monopoly proﬁt it would earn by innovating. Thus a lower costs for imitators, the most
likely case to arise absent IP protection, does not by itself ensure that ﬁrms have a ﬁrst-mover
advantage or that they will ﬁnd it desirable to pursue so-called imitation strategies.
Next there are a number of monotone relationships between imitation cost and the equilibrium
investment thresholds and outcomes in the model. First, the higher is the imitation cost, the
higher is the standalone threshold for the follower ﬁrm (YF ). Note though that actual follower
entry may or may not occur at this threshold, since innovation can occur at a threshold beyond this
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standalone threshold in an attrition regime where the support of mixed strategies extends beyond
YF . The eﬀect of imitation cost on the innovation threshold is consistently negative throughout
the range of imitation costs. As imitation cost increases, in the attrition regime the distribution
of innovator entry thresholds is shifted leftward whereas in the preemption regime the preemption
threshold decreases, so innovation occurs earlier in both cases. The eﬀect of higher imitation cost
on the imitation threshold is monotone under preemption since ∂YF /∂K > 0, but this is not
the case under attrition. This is because in an attrition regime, a greater imitation cost delays
imitation only if the innovation threshold realization is low enough that there is a positive lag before
imitation occurs (if Y˜A ≤ YF ). Otherwise the onset of imitation, immediately after innovation, is
itself random and its distribution (to the right of YF ) is shifted leftward by an increase in imitation
cost. Despite this complex eﬀect of imitation cost on the timing of imitation, the gap (and therefore
the expected time lag) between innovation and imitation thresholds, max
{
YF , Y˜A
}
− Y˜A is weakly
increasing in K. To summarize, an increase in imitation cost may properly be said to accelerate
innovative investment and the arrival of imitative investment conditional upon innovation having
occurred.
Lastly, there exists a simple relationship between imitation cost and equilibrium industry per-
formance. Because in the diﬀerent regimes of attrition and preemption, competition between ﬁrms
to secure either second- or ﬁrst-mover advantages results in the dissipation of any positional rents,
equilibrium ﬁrm and industry values have a straightforward expression (Corollary 1). Moreover,
max {L (YL) , L (YS)} which constitutes the equilibrium ﬁrm value in an attrition regime is either
independent of (if K ≤ K˜) or increasing in K (if K˜ < K < K̂) whereas F (YF ) which constitutes
the equilibrium ﬁrm value in a preemption regime is decreasing in K. Since industry value is
nondecreasing and subsequently increasing in K under attrition up until K̂ and decreasing in K
thereafter under preemption, it is therefore only when the level of the imitation cost is such that
neither of these regimes occurs (K = K̂) that investment thresholds are set optimally from the
standpoint of industry proﬁt. All else equal then, it is in those industries in which imitation cost
reaches the level at which ﬁrms do not have an incentive to seek a positional advantage of either
sort that industry value is maximized.
Proposition 2 Expected industry value is a quasiconcave function of imitation cost which is ini-
tially constant (over
(
0, K˜
)
) with a unique maximum when imitation cost is such neither attrition
nor preemption occur (at K = K̂).
Proposition 2 states that there exists an initial range over which expected ﬁrm value is inde-
pendent of imitation cost before increasing thereafter. In economic terms, this means that starting
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from a suﬃciently low level, product introduction is more timely and ﬁrms beneﬁt ex-ante from
raising the ﬁxed cost of imitation enough to shield an innovator from instantaneous imitation
with positive probability. Moreover, and despite the wasteful nature of ﬁxed costs for the second
ﬁrm ex-post (to the extent that these include duplicative expenditures), raising ﬁxed costs for the
second ﬁrm is strictly beneﬁcial for the industry (over
(
K˜, K̂
)
) when the endogenous timing of
investments is accounted for. Aside from the straightforward description of industry value it pro-
vides, Proposition 2 is also instrumental in establishing our main welfare results in the remainder
of this section, which we turn to next.
4.2 Social welfare and optimal protection of innovation
We take the view that regulators can inﬂuence the relative cost of imitation through a choice of
IP protection level which we interpret as patent breadth. With this instrument and provided that
the natural imitation cost is not so high as to constrain the regulator's choice (it seems doubtful
that imitation would be subsidized), the imitation cost may be viewed as a decision variable. We
consider a second-best welfare benchmark in this section, in which ﬁrms are free to select their
entry thresholds and product market output or prices so welfare is a function of the imitation cost,
K.
To provide intuition for the welfare analysis, it is useful to decompose the expected welfare in
the equilibrium of the investment game into three parts: expected industry value, the consumer
surplus resulting from innovator entry and the consumer surplus resulting from imitator entry.
By Proposition 2 the ﬁrst of these components is single-peaked with a maximum at the critical
imitation cost K̂. The two consumer surplus terms depend on imitation cost in roughly opposite
ways, at least under preemption. A higher imitation cost unambiguously accelerates innovator
entry which raises the consumer surplus from innovation term, so the second welfare component
is monotonically increasing in K. Under preemption, higher imitation cost unambiguously delays
imitator entry and the third welfare component is monotonically decreasing in K. But under
attrition, the impact of imitation cost on imitator entry is more complex. Over that part of
the support of mixed strategies where innovation occurs early enough (Y˜A ≤ YF ) an increase
of imitation cost delays imitation and reduces the consumer surplus from imitation, but where
innovation occurs late enough (Y˜A > YF , which holds for the entire support of mixed strategies
if K < K˜), imitation is immediate and an increase of imitation cost raises the second consumer
surplus term.
To study social welfare precisely, suppose that consumer surplus is scaled by the market size
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parameter Yt as is the case for ﬁrm proﬁts. Let CSM and CSD then denote the unitary ﬂows
of consumer surplus under monopoly and under duopoly respectively. The social discount rate is
assumed to be r for simplicity, identical to that of ﬁrms. Recalling the innovation threshold YI
has a nondegenerate distribution for K < K̂, expected social welfare then has the speciﬁc form
W (K) = 2 min {F (YF ) ,max {L (YL) , L (YS)}}︸ ︷︷ ︸
industry value
+ E
CSM
r − α
[
Y˜I
]−(β−1)
yβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from innovation
+ E
CSD − CSM
r − α
[
max
{
Y˜I , YF
}]−(β−1)
yβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer surplus from imitation
. (8)
The ﬁrst summand in (8) is expected industry value. By Proposition 2 it is constant forK < K˜
and strictly quasiconcave in K thereafter with a maximum at K̂. The second term is the expected
consumer surplus that results from innovative investment. As discussed above this term increases
with K, since a higher imitation cost shifts the distribution of innovator entry thresholds (which
is degenerate at YP under preemption) leftward. The third term is the expected consumer surplus
that results from the imitator's entry into the market, which involves a more complex dependence
on K as described above. Although there is no closed-form expression for the entire function (8),
there is a semi-closed form for K ≥ K̂ and we are able to bound the function over the remainder
of its domain suﬃciently in order to obtain a partial characterization of the social optimum (see
Section A.6 for the full proof).
First, in the preemption range (for K > K̂) the innovator and imitator entry thresholds are
respectively YP and YF , the former of which does not have a closed-form expression. Nevertheless
the semi-explicit form of W (K) allows us to evaluate the unique local optimum of (8) under
preemption, which we denote KP . For a range of parameter values β ∈ [β0,∞), β0 > 1, this
optimum is a corner solution (KP = ∞). The social planner's imitation cost instrument is of
too limited a reach to attain its welfare objective in such cases, so that for suﬃciently large β
the socially optimal form of preemption is a winner-take-all contest. Since the greatest amount of
preemption that the social planner can generate does not foster enough competition to induce ﬁrms
to enter suﬃciently early in such cases, a single ﬁrm is active ex-post whose investment threshold
is determined by the threat of potential entry. On the other hand, if the discounting parameter is
not too large (β ∈ (1, β0)) as occurs for instance if volatility is suﬃciently high, KP is ﬁnite and
strictly greater than K̂ so long as consumer surplus under monopoly is positive (CSM > 0).
Second, even without an explicit form for W (K) within this range, another possible maximum
of welfare can be shown to arise under attrition. To establish this, because W (K) is continuous it
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suﬃces to show that social welfare is decreasing to the left of the critical value K̂, which involves
showing that lim
K→K̂−W
′(K) < 0. For simplicity set CSM = 0 so that the middle term in (8)
can be ignored. Since the expected industry value term reaches an interior maximum at K̂, its
derivative at this point vanishes. The left derivative of social welfare at K̂ is then equal to the
left derivative of the consumer surplus from imitation term. In an attrition regime and near K̂
(for K ∈
(
K˜, K̂
)
), this term has two parts that correspond to innovator investment threshold
realizations below Y ′S (in which case imitator investment occurs at YF , see Figure 2) or above YS (in
which case imitation immediately follows innovation). Accounting for the equilibrium distribution
of the imitation threshold max
{
Y˜I , YF
}
, the consumer surplus from imitation is
(CSD − CSM )
r − α [YF ]
−(β−1) yβ
(
G∧ (YS) +
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1 dG∧(s)
)
. (9)
At K̂ the equilibrium distribution G∧ converges to a degenerate distribution at YL and the integral
term vanishes. Just to the left of K̂, changes in K therefore have a negligible eﬀect on the
distribution of entry thresholds and only the direct eﬀect on YF matters, which is suﬃcient to
establish the desired result.
Either type of local maximum (under attrition or preemption) can be a global maximum
depending on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting from innovation and from
imitation.
Proposition 3 If the timing of entry is regulated indirectly through an imitation cost instrument,
(i) either attrition or preemption may constitute a social optimum;
(ii) if the social optimum involves attrition, the cost of imitation is positive with K∗ > K˜ (winner-
pays-some);
(iii) if the social optimum involves preemption, innovation occurs at the threshold Y ∗P = ψYL,
ψ ∈ [(β − 1) /β, 1]; for β large enough a perpetual monopoly is optimal, that is K∗ =∞ (winner-
take-all).14
The upshot of Proposition 3 is that there is no one size ﬁts all prescription with respect
to balancing the incentives of innovating and imitating ﬁrms, suggesting that policy is best de-
termined on a case by case basis according to a number of industry conditions as is generally
14See Section A.6 for a characterization of ψ := max
{
β−1
β
,
(
CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2
β
)
/
(
CSD
piD
− β−1
β
CSM
piM
+ 2
β
)}
. Note
that in contrast with the optimal preemption thresholds that we derive explicitly, in preemption games these
thresholds generally do not have analytic expressions.
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understood in the literature on IP protection levels. The proposition is nevertheless informative
in a number of ways.
Part (ii) oﬀers some practical guidance and is especially relevant insofar as some researchers
have argued for the abolition of patents altogether (e.g. Boldrin and Levine [3]). Our model points
to the fact that such an abolition is desirable only to the extent that the natural cost of imitation is
suﬃciently high, i.e. that K ≥ K˜ without IP protection. This lower bound on imitation cost has a
straightforward characterization, in that industry conditions must be such that an innovator has a
positive ex-ante probability of earning a monopoly proﬁt rather than face immediate imitation with
certainty, that is to say it must have some chance of avoiding the situation described by Scherer
(see footnote 4 above). This lower bound can be used, for example, to assess the initiatives that
have been taken in the pharmaceutical industry in order to reduce the relative cost of imitation
and encourage generic competition. In low- and middle-income countries, often characterized by
a rapidly expanding and highly uncertain demand which makes attrition more likely to prevail,
optimal social welfare in the local market may involve attrition but in all cases requires that a
minimal level of IP protection be maintained so that there remains a window of market sizes in
which an innovator entering suﬃciently early is incentivized by a period of monopoly proﬁts.
Part (iii) establishes that in other circumstances where ﬁrms suﬃciently discount the future,
that is when demand growth and volatility are suﬃciently low (recall that ∂β/∂α < 0 and ∂β/∂σ <
0), the optimal form of preemption is a winner-take-all contest. In that case, the greatest amount
of preemption that the social planner can induce (K∗ =∞, a corner solution derived in Appendix
A.6) implies that a single ﬁrm is active ex-post. Its investment threshold, YP (K
∗) = (r−α)I/piM
corresponds to the Marshallian investment threshold and is determined by the threat of potential
entry by the other ﬁrm, which in equilibrium never enters (as limK→∞ YF =∞).
Even in the absence of a universal policy prescription certain industry characteristics can play
a role in determining optimal protection levels. The following corollary provides two intuitive
applications of part (i) of the previous proposition.
Corollary 3 In a constrained social optimum:
(i) if there is perfect price discrimination under monopoly (CSM = 0), attrition is socially optimal;
(ii) if there is collusion in the product market (CSD + 2piD = CSM + piM ), preemption is socially
optimal.
In part (i) of the corollary, the innovator can price discriminate perfectly, so it does not
contribute to the consumer surplus. Therefore, imitation is needed for consumers to beneﬁt from
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the sequence of investments and an optimal protection regime favors imitation incentives under
the constraint that innovation, as a necessary condition for imitation, must be incentivized as well.
At the opposite extreme is the situation of part (ii), where imitator entry does not change the
instantaneous welfare because of collusion in the product market. Then only innovation contributes
to social welfare, and a high though not necessarily inﬁnite imitation cost is needed to incite
early enough investment in a preemption regime.
Aside from such speciﬁc cases as those above, the absence of a closed form in the preemp-
tion range renders the characterization of optimal welfare more complex. By making an ad-
ditional restriction however, we are able to obtain a general result relating optimal welfare to
demand characteristics. Suppose therefore that the static entry incentive is socially excessive
(piD ≥ (CSD + 2piD) − (CSM + piM )). To provide a rationale for this restriction, recall that in a
static setting with symmetric ﬁrms and homogeneous goods, Mankiw and Whinston [25] show that
there is excess entry in an industry if total output increases whereas individual outputs decrease
in the number of ﬁrms (the business-stealing eﬀect) and argue that these assumptions characterize
a broad range of common models of oligopoly. In our dynamic setting, this assumption is useful
because it allows us to bound the welfare associated with the imitator's entry by the expected
value of a duopoly ﬁrm, and hence by E V (YL, YL)|K=K̂ (according to Proposition 2), so as to
establish the following.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the static private entry incentive is socially excessive. Then, in a
constrained social optimum preemption is optimal if
CSM
piM
≥ Ω (β) .15 (10)
As the right-hand term is decreasing in β with lim→∞Ω (β) = 0, the condition (10) is satisﬁed
for any given demand speciﬁcation if there is suﬃcient discounting, as occurs if industry growth
and volatility are suﬃciently low. This condition provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that
IP protection should be signiﬁcant in such markets.
We conclude this section by applying Proposition 4 to two common homogeneous goods
oligopoly speciﬁcations.
Example Suppose that the product market is characterized by a linear inverse demand P = A−BQ,
A,B > 0 and that ﬁrms have constant unit variable cost c. Then CSM/piM = 0.5 and evaluating
Ω (β) establishes that (10) is satisﬁed for β ≥ 3.14. If the product market is characterized instead
15See Section A.7 for a derivation of Ω (β) := 2/
((
ββ/ (β − 1)β−1
)
− β
)
.
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by a constant elasticity inverse demand P = AQ−1/ε, A > 0 and ε > 1, then straightforward
calculations establish CSM/piM = 1/ (ε− 1) so (10) is satisﬁed for any β if demand is suﬃciently
elastic (if ε ≥ 1 + (1/Ω (β))).
5 Endogenous imitation cost, buyout and licensing
In this section, we discuss further real-world aspects of innovation and imitation and show how
they ﬁt into the framework of the previous sections. One aspect is the ability of an innovating ﬁrm
to raise the entry barrier of the imitator, either by developing a product that is more costly to
reverse engineer or by strengthening the patentability of its product. Another aspect is contracting
between the innovator and the imitator, which can take the form of buyout of the rival ﬁrm or of
a technology transfer that reduces the follower's imitation cost. From a formal standpoint these
two extensions both add an intermediate decision layer to the investment game in the monopoly
phase, once the innovator's entry has occurred and before the imitator invests. By raising the
standalone value of the innovating ﬁrm, both extensions tend to favor ﬁrst-mover advantage and
the emergence of preemption regimes although the implications for imitation timing and welfare
largely diﬀer.
5.1 Endogenous imitation cost
Suppose that the innovating ﬁrm may rely on a variable amount of either technical or legal pro-
tection in order to determine the imitation cost of a subsequent entrant. In case of technical
protection, imitation cost is determined in part by the cost of reverse engineering, which can be
raised by increasing product complexity. For example an innovating ﬁrm can expend eﬀort to
render its product more diﬃcult to disassemble, or even add misleading complexity (Samuelson
and Scotchmer [30]). In the case of legal protection, the imitation cost is related to patent breadth
with wider patents implying higher costs for inventing around so as to develop a non-infringing
imitation, and ﬁrms moreover may decide to pursue patent protection more or less aggressively,
as is the case for pharmaceutical ﬁrms as discussed in Section 2.
Such behavior is incorporated into the model of investment by supposing that at the time of
its investment at a threshold Yi an innovating ﬁrm chooses to expend an additional irrecuperable
cost, which we denote by ρ, that raises the imitating ﬁrm's ﬁxed cost by an amount f (ρ). The
increase in imitation cost is assumed to be instantaneous and the function f is taken to twice
diﬀerentiable with f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≤ 0 as well as f(0) = 0 and limρ→0 f ′(ρ) = ∞. The investment
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costs of the innovator and imitator are redeﬁned as I (ρ) := I0 + ρ and K (ρ) := K0 + f (ρ) where
I0 and K0 represent then baseline values where no cost-raising expenditure is undertaken.
Proceeding by backward induction, in the continuation stage the imitator payoﬀ F (Y ) and
standalone threshold YF are accordingly functions of the innovator's eﬀort through K(ρ). At
the moment of innovation therefore, an innovator entering at the threshold Yi faces the decision
problem
max
ρ∈R+
LE (Yi, ρ) :=
(
piM
r − αYi − I0 − ρ
)(
y
Yi
)β
− piM − piD
r − α
yβ
[max {Yi, YF (ρ)}]β−1
.
Let ρ∗ (Yi) denote the solution to this problem. At an interior solution, YF (ρ∗) > Yi and ρ∗
satisﬁes
β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
f ′ (ρ∗) =
(
YF (ρ
∗)
Yi
)β
A straightforward comparative static argument establishes that the optimal cost-raising eﬀort is
increasing in the investment threshold and decreasing in the baseline imitation cost. The latter
property is in line with the biopharmaceutical industry case discussed in Section 2, where ﬁrms
typically place greater reliance on patenting in the medications segment in which natural entry
barriers are low than in the vaccines segment.
To proceed further we focus on the situation whereK0 ≥ K̂ so the investment game is naturally
preemptive.16 Allowing the cost of imitation to be endogenous results in a higher leader payoﬀ
LE (Y, ρ
∗ (Y )) and a lower follower payoﬀ FE (Y, ρ∗ (Y )) = F (Y )|K=K0+ρ∗(Y ) that when this cost
is exogenous. This makes the investment game more preemptive. Since equilibrium payoﬀs are
pegged to the follower value under preemption, ﬁrms have a lower expected value in equilibrium.
To avoid this penalizing outcome ﬁrms would prefer to both commit ex-ante not to exert any
cost-raising eﬀort in case they happen to lead the investment process. One way to achieve such a
commitment is by agreeing to an open or common technological standard.
Proposition 5 If the cost of imitation is endogenous and the investment game is naturally pre-
emptive ﬁrms beneﬁt from agreeing ex-ante to a common standard.
16This restriction is not necessarily strictly speaking necessary for the analysis but relates speciﬁcally to optimal
stopping. If the innovation threshold is high enough, corner solutions ρ∗ = 0 arise that result in a kink of the
function LE. In such cases the threshold strategies we assume ﬁrms to follow needn't correspond to optimal
investment behavior. Under preemption however such high innovation thresholds occur only oﬀ the equilibrium
path.
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5.2 Buyout and licensing
Contracting in a variety of forms, ranging from joint ventures and diﬀerent types of licensing
contracts to acquisitions and pay-for-delay agreements, generally plays an important role in inno-
vation decisions. These diﬀerent measures have contrasting eﬀects on investment incentives that
can be readily sketched out within our framework. Suppose that ﬁrms have the opportunity to
contract only once to transfer either asset or technology ownership in exchange for a lump sum
transfer (ϕ) from the innovating ﬁrm to the imitating ﬁrm, and assume for simplicity that the
contract is written by the innovator who detains all bargaining power.
Because of the eﬃciency eﬀect (piM > 2piD), it is proﬁtable in principle for an innovator to
pay for its rival not to subsequently enter the market, by buying it out if it can or engaging in a
limiting case of a pay-for-delay agreement. Proceeding by backward induction, in the continuation
phase that begins when innovation occurs at a threshold Yi, the remaining ﬁrm has an expected
payoﬀ F (Yi). At the moment the ﬁrst ﬁrm innovates, the rival's continuation payoﬀ constitutes a
participation constraint for any contract that the innovator oﬀers. The innovating ﬁrm therefore
oﬀers a transfer ϕ∗ (Yi) =C (Yi) when it invests whose value at t = 0 is F (Y ) and the leader payoﬀ
becomes
LB (Y ) :=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − F (Y ) .
The eﬀect of allowing buyouts on the investment game is intuitive. In comparison with the
case where they are ruled out, the follower payoﬀ is unchanged whereas the leader payoﬀ is at
least as large rendering preemption more likely. It can be shown that all else equal the magnitude
of the impact of the buyout option on the leader payoﬀ depends on the strength of the eﬃciency
eﬀect, and if the latter is suﬃciently strong or in industries with suﬃciently high demand growth
or volatility (speciﬁcally if piM/piD ≥ β + 1) attrition does not occur for any level of K.
Whether the possibility of buyout runs in the interest of ﬁrms or not depends on the cost
of imitation. Under preemption expected proﬁts are pegged to the follower value and therefore
unaﬀected by the possibility of buyouts, whereas if the industry functions naturally under attrition
(K < K̂) they are pegged to the leader value and increase if the possibility of buyouts is introduced,
so that one would expect a more active market for acquisitions to develop in such industries, and
all the more so if demand growth and volatility are high.
If a buyout is not possible an innovator must contend with follower entry but can recoup
revenue from the imitator's investment by setting an appropriate license fee. Suppose that K =
K0 +KI where K0 is an incompressible level of imitation cost reﬂecting such items as distribution
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and marketing expenses and KI denotes the part of the imitator's product development cost that
can be eliminated by a technology transfer from the innovator. Because licensing does not allow
the innovator to push back the moment of imitation, the optimal policy is to set the maximum
license fee at the moment of imitation consistent with the participation constraint, ϕ∗ = −KI .
Proceeding by backward induction, the expected revenue from licensing constitutes an addi-
tional term and raises the leader payoﬀ which becomes
LL (Y ) :=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − (piM − piD
r − α max {Y, YF } −KI
)(
y
max {Y, YF }
)β
.
As the leader payoﬀ shifts up to the left of YF while leaving the follower payoﬀ function un-
changed, the investment game is more preemptive with licensing as in the case of buyouts. How-
ever whereas the welfare consequences of introducing buyouts are ambiguous (ﬁrms weakly beneﬁt
and the consumer surplus from innovation increases because product innovation occurs earlier,
but the consumer surplus from imitation is eliminated), the welfare consequences of licensing are
unambiguously positive. The visible eﬀect of licensing is of course the corresponding reduction in
the duplication of R&D eﬀorts, but the indirect beneﬁt (beyond any increase in ﬁrm value that
may occur if the industry functions initially under attrition) stems from the resulting acceleration
of innovation which raises consumer surplus.
Thus,
Proposition 6 With contracting between the innovator and the imitator (i) buyouts are the pre-
ferred instrument of an innovator and raise industry proﬁt if K < K̂ whereas (ii) licensing is
Pareto improving.
6 Conclusion
We have sought to develop a framework to study the allocation of resources to innovation and
to imitation that explicitly incorporates interrelated investment decisions under uncertainty by
imperfectly competitive ﬁrms. As compared with the classic literature on patent breadth, by
endogenizing the time at which innovation and imitation occur we are able to highlight a novel
channel through which IP protection levels act upon welfare through their eﬀect on the dynamic
competition between ﬁrms.
The main message that emerges from our analysis is a broadly familiar one insofar as we ﬁnd
that IP protection levels must be suﬃciently high to provide appropriate incentives for innovation.
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By integrating the theory of investment under uncertainty into the analysis of innovation incentives
we are able to sharpen this general perspective by pinpointing speciﬁc market characteristics
that correspond to key determinants of investment, and which provide a grounding for strong IP
protection in circumstances that seem most likely to be present in mature industries. In such
industries then we ﬁnd that the barriers to imitation should be suﬃciently high so as to render
dynamic competition between ﬁrms preemptive, and if discounting is important enough it should
take the form of a winner-take-all contest.
In those industries in which growth and volatility are suﬃciently high, and which are those most
typically associated with vibrant innovation, attrition may also be optimal so that the additional
beneﬁts of imitation resulting from greater product market competition do not arrive excessively
late. Even then IP protection may be necessary if the cost of imitation is extremely low, in order
to ensure that a ﬁrm that develops an imitative product as the winner of the attrition game
nevertheless pays some and that an industry does not become mired in ineﬃcient dynamics
described by Scherer (1980).
Throughout our analysis we have sought to illustrate the theory with stylized facts pertaining
to a speciﬁc industry, the biopharmaceutical industry, in which both innovation and the regulation
of innovation play a central role. In the practice of antitrust and industrial policy decisions it is
common to focus upon static product market characteristics. Those demand characteristic that
we have sought to highlight though, demand growth and volatility, play at least as signiﬁcant
a role in determining the investment incentives and product development decisions, and as such
should naturally underlie any determination of optimal IP protection levels.
References
[1] Arora A, Branstetter L,Chatterjee C (2008) Strong medicine: patent reform and the emer-
gence of a research-driven pharmaceutical industry in India, Paper presented at the NBER
conference, Location of Biopharmaceutical Activity, Savannah, GA, March 7 2008.
[2] Billette de Villemeur E, Ruble R, Versaevel B (2014) Investment timing and vertical relation-
ships, International Journal of Industrial Organization 33:110-123.
[3] Boldrin M, Levine D (2013) The case against patents, Journal of Economic Perspectives
27(1):3-22.
29
[4] Chevalier-Roignant B, Trigeorgis L (2011) Competitive Strategy: Options and Games, (Cam-
bridge: MIT Press).
[5] Cohen W M, Nelson RR, Walsh JP (2000) Protecting their intellectual assets: appropriability
conditions and why U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms patent (or not), NBERWorking Paper No. 7552.
[6] Denicolò V (1996) Patent races and optimal patent breadth and length, Journal of Industrial
Economics 44(3):249-265.
[7] Denicolò V, Franzoni L (2010) On the winner-take-all principle in innovation races, Journal
of the European Economic Association 8(5):1133-1158.
[8] Dixit A, Pindyck R (1994) Investment under Uncertainty, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press).
[9] Encaoua D, Guellec D, Martinez C (2006) Patent systems for encouraging innovation: Lessons
from economic analysis, Research Policy 35(9):1423-1440.
[10] Femminis G, Martini G (2011) Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic
duopoly, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35(7):1061-1090.
[11] Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1985) Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new tech-
nology, Review of Economic Studies 52(3):383-401.
[12] Gallini N (1992) Patent policy and costly imitation, RAND Journal of Economics 23(1):52-63.
[13] Gilbert R, Shapiro C (1990) Optimal patent length and breadth, RAND Journal of Economics
21(1):106-112.
[14] Grabowski HG, DiMasi JA, Long G, (2015) The roles of patents and research and development
incentives in biopharmaceutical innovation, Health Aﬀairs 34(2):302-310.
[15] Green J, Scotchmer S (1995) On the division of proﬁt in sequential innovation, RAND Journal
of Economics 26(1):20-33.
[16] Guey Chuen P, Huan-Yao L, Yee-Shin L, Kulkanya C (2011) Dengue vaccines: challenge and
confrontation,World Journal of Vaccines 1:109-130.
[17] Hendricks K, Weiss A, Wilson C (1988) The war of attrition in continuous time with complete
information, International Economic Review 29(4):663-680.
30
[18] Henry E (2010) Runner-up patents: is monopoly inevitable?, Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics 112(2):417-440.
[19] Henry E, Ruiz-Aliseda F (2015) Keeping secrets: the economics of access deterrence, mimeo.
[20] Hoen E, Berger J, Calmy A, Moon S (2011) Driving a decade of change: HIV/AIDS, patents
and access to medicines for all, Journal of the International AIDS Society 14:15-26.
[21] Hoppe H (2000) Second-mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under
uncertainty, International Journal of Industrial Organization 18:315-338.
[22] Katz M, Shapiro C (1987) R and D rivalry with licensing or imitation, American Economic
Review 77(3):402-420.
[23] Klemperer, P (1990) How bread should the scope of patent protection be?, Rand Journal of
Economics 21(1):113-130.
[24] La Manna M, MacLeod R, de Meza D (1989) The case for permissive patents, European
Economic Review 33(7):1427-43.
[25] Mankiw G, Whinston M (1986) Free entry and social ineﬃciency, RAND Journal of Economics
17(1):48-58.
[26] Maurer SM, Scotchmer S (2002) The independent invention defence in intellectual property,
Economica 69(276):535-547.
[27] Mukherjee A, Pennings E (2004) Imitation, patent protection, and welfare, Oxford Economic
Papers 56(4):715-733.
[28] Reinganum J (1981) On the diﬀusion of a new technology: a game theoretic approach, Review
of Economic Studies 48(3):395-405.
[29] Riedel F, Steg J-H (2017) Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games, forthcoming
Journal of Mathematical Economics
[30] Samuelson P, Scotchmer S (2002) The law and economics of reverse engineering, Yale Law
Journal 111:1575-1663.
[31] Scherer F, Watal J (2002) Post-TRIPS options for access to patented medicines in developing
countries, Journal of International Economic Law 5(4):913-939.
31
[32] Thijssen J (2013) Game theoretic real options and competition risk, in: Bensoussan A, Peng
S, Sung J (eds.), Real Options, Ambiguity, Risk and Insurance (Amsterdam: IOS Press).
[33] Thijssen J, Huisman K, Kort P (2006) The eﬀects of information on strategic investment and
welfare, Economic Theory 28(2):399-424.
[34] Thijssen J, Huisman K, Kort P (2012) Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic
real option models, Journal of Mathematical Economics 48(4):219-225.
[35] Wilson P (2010) Giving developing countries the best shot: An overview of vaccine access
and R&D, Oxfam International, 28 pages.
[36] Witty A (2010) New strategies for innovation in global health: A pharmaceutical industry
perspective, Health Aﬀairs 30(1):118-126.
A Proofs and derivations
A.1 Continuation payoﬀ C
Once the rival ﬁrm has invested at Yt = y any remaining ﬁrm holds a standard growth option
(Dixit and Pindyck [8]) whose value is obtained by solving an optimal stopping problem
C (y) = sup
τ≥t
Ey
 ∞∫
τ
piDYse
−rsds−Ke−rτ
 .
From the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation it follows that the value function C(y) satisﬁes
rC (y) dt = EydC (y)
and expanding the right-hand side using Itô's lemma yields the ordinary diﬀerential equation that
C(y) solves in the continuation region (0, YF ),
rC = αyC ′ +
1
2
σ2y2C ′′,
along with boundary and smooth pasting conditions
C (0) = 0
C (YF ) =
piD
r − αYF −K
C ′ (YF ) = 1.
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The function C (y) = A1y
β1+A2y
β2 is a candidate solution. The associated fundamental quadratic
is 0.5σ2β (β − 1) + βα− r = 0. It has two roots of which only
β =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2r
σ2
is positive. Setting β1 = β and A2 = 0 to satisfy the ﬁrst boundary condition, it follows from the
remaining conditions that
YF =
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
K
and that A1 = (1/β) [YF ]
−(β−1) which yields the expression for AC in the text.
A.2 Leader, follower and simultaneous investment payoﬀ functions L, F and
M
A.2.1 Derivation of L,F and M
The expression (3) is obtained from the deﬁnition of L (Y ) by the following steps. Since the rival's
entry can equivalently be viewed as a negative shock to the ﬁrm's perpetual stream of monopoly
proﬁts starting at time τ (max {Y, YF }),
Ey
(∫ τ(max{Y,YF })
τ(Y )
piMYse
−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I +
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,YF })
piDYse
−rsds
)
= Ey
(∫ ∞
τ(Y )
piMYse
−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I −
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,YF })
(piM − piD)Yse−rsds
)
.
Moving the constant terms outside the integrals and using Eye−rτ(Y )ds = (y/Y )β , the martingale
property of Brownian motion and Ey
∫∞
0 Yse
−rsds = (y/ (r − α)),
Ey
(∫ ∞
τ(Y )
piMYse
−rsds− e−rτ(Y )I −
∫ ∞
τ(max{Y,YF })
(piM − piD)Yse−rsds
)
=
(
piM
r − αY − I
)( y
Y
)β − piM − piD
r − α
yβ
[max {Y, YF }]β−1
.
The expression for the follower payoﬀ (4) results from discounting the continuation payoﬀ C,
which is realized at the threshold max {Y, YF }, to the current time and level of the stochastic
shock. Finally the simultaneous payoﬀ (5) is derived similarly to (3), noting that the ﬂow proﬁt
upon investment is piD instead of piM and that there is no follow-on entry so the bound ∞ can be
substituted for τ (max {Y, YF }) in the ﬁrst integral and the second integral dropped altogether.
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A.2.2 Behavior of L,F and M
The most straightforward continuation payoﬀs to study are M and F , and these are discussed
ﬁrst before studying L.
First, M (Y ) = ((piD/ (r − α))Y − I) (y/Y )β is quasiconcave in Y over (y,∞) with a max-
imum at YS := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD) such that YS > y by the assumption on Y0, and
limY→∞M (Y ) = 0. Observe that M (Y ) is independent of K.
Next, it is convenient to express F (Y ), which is the value at t = 0 of perceiving the continu-
ation payoﬀ C (Y ;K), as
F (Y ) =
 ACyβ , Y < YF( piD
r−αY −K
) ( y
Y
)β
, Y ≥ YF
.
Note that F is diﬀerentiable at YF . If K < ((β − 1)piDy) / (β (r − α)), YF < y and F is strictly
decreasing in Y over (y,∞). Otherwise F is constant over [y, YF ] and decreasing over (YF ,∞)
with limY→∞ F (Y ) = 0.
An increase in K has two principal eﬀects on F (Y ): YF increases so the graph of F is ﬂat over
a longer interval and F (Y ) increases for all K so the graph of F shifts upward. The comparison
of M (Y ) and F (Y ) is straightforward: YS < (>)YF if and only if K > (<) I and if K < I then
M (Y ) < F (Y ) for all Y whereas if K > I then M (Y ) > F (Y ) over a half-line (a,∞) where
a ∈ (y, YS).
Finally, the leader payoﬀ L (Y ) is typically deﬁned in parts according to whether Y is greater or
smaller than YF . If K < ((β − 1)piDy) / (β (r − α)), necessarily YF < Y and follower investment
is immediate at any threshold, so that L (Y ) = M (Y ) since the leader ﬁrm does not enjoy a
monopoly phase. Thus
L (Y ) =

(
piM
r−αY − I
) ( y
Y
)β − piM−piDr−α YF ( yYF )β , Y < YF
M (Y ) , Y ≥ YF
.
Note that L is continuous with a kink at YF . The ﬁrst part of L is quasiconcave in Y with a
maximum at YL := (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piM ) such that YL > y by assumption.
An increase in K has two principal eﬀects on L (Y ): YF increases reducing the range over
which the graphs of L and M overlap, and the ﬁrst part of L (Y ) increases shifting the graph of
L upward (a level eﬀect). Because piM > piD, YL < YS for all K whereas YL < (>)YF if and only
if I < (>) (piM/piD)K. Given the ranking of YS and YF discussed above it follows that whenever
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K ≤ I, L has two local maxima (YL and YS). It is shown in the next subsection that there exists
a critical threshold K˜ < I such that YL (YS) is a global maximum of L if and only if K > (<) K˜.
The relationship between L and M is straightforward as L is greater than M over (y, YF ) and
the two functions coincide over [YF ,∞). To compare L and F ﬁrst note that for suﬃciently low
values of K, L < F for all Y , but otherwise the two functions may intersect. It is also shown
in the next subsection that there exists a critical threshold K̂ < I such that i) YL is a global
maximum of L and ii) both L and F attain the same maximum value at YL and YF respectively.
Above this threshold, direct calculations establish that either K < I in which case F > L over an
interval (a′, b′) ⊆ (y, YF ) or K ≥ I in which case L ≥ F for all Y .
A.2.3 Critical thresholds K˜ and K̂
The threshold K˜ solves L (YL) = M (YS). If K˜ < (piD/piM )I then max {YL, YF } = YL so after
substituting, L (YL) = ((piD/ (r − α))YL − I) (y/YL)β = M (YL) < M (YS) since YS is the unique
global maximizer of M . Hence it must be that K˜ ≥ (piD/piM )I, and therefore satisﬁes(
piM
r − αYL − I
)(
y
YL
)β
− piM − piD
r − α YF
(
y
YF
)β
=
(
piD
r − αYS − I
)(
y
YS
)β
.
Multiplying both sides by (YF /y)
β (note that YF /YL = (piM/piD)
(
K˜/I
)
and YF /YS = K˜/I here)
and substituting for remaining YL, YF and YS terms yields
1
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β [
K˜
]β
I−(β−1) +
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K˜ =
1
β − 1
[
K˜
]β
I−(β−1)
which has a unique positive solution,
K˜ =
β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(
piM
piD
)β − 1

1
β−1
I.
The threshold K̂ solves L (YL) = L (YF ). If K ≤ K˜ then as shown above L (YL) ≤ M (YS)
whereas M (YS) < L (YF ). Hence it must be that K̂ > K˜ (and max {YL, YF } = YF ). This
threshold therefore solves
(
piM
r − αYL − I
)(
y
YL
)β
− piM − piD
r − α YF
(
y
YF
)β
=
yβ
β [YF ]
(β−1) .
35
Multiplying both sides by (YF /y)
β (note that here YF /YL = (piM/piD)
(
K̂/I
)
) and substi-
tuting for remaining YL and YF terms yields
I
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β [
K̂
]β
I−(β−1) +
β
β − 1
(
1− piM
piD
)
K̂ =
K̂
β − 1 .
which has a unique positive solution,
K̂ =
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
(
piM
piD
)β

1
β−1
I. (12)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
A.3.1 Part (i)
As discussed in the text and illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 there are two subcases to consider in
order to establish this part of the proposition, K ≤ K˜ and K˜ < K < K̂.
K ≤ K˜ case This case corresponds to a standard attrition game over (YS ,∞). It is therefore
only necessary to verify that ﬁrms do not move in [y, YS ] with positive probability, in which case
a speciﬁc form for the equilibrium distribution can be derived following standard arguments.
First, if Yi ∈ [y, YS), V (Yi, Yj) = L (Yi) < M (YS) if Yi < Yj , = M (Yi) < M (YS) if Yi = Yj ,
= F (Yj) if Yi > Yj , so V (Yi, Yj) ≤ V (YS , Yj) for any Yj so that any Yi in this interval is a
dominated strategy. If Yi = YS then it must be veriﬁed that players do not play an atom at
this point in a symmetric equilibrium. But if player j invests at YS with probability q > 0, by
continuity of L there exists ε > 0 such that EV (YS , Y˜j) = qM (YS) + (1− q)L (YS) = M (YS) <
qF (YS + ε) + (1− q)L (YS + ε) ≈ EV (YS + ε, Y˜j).
Following Hendricks et al. [17] ﬁrms randomize investment triggers continuously over [YS ,∞).
To derive the unconditional equilibrium distribution assume that ﬁrm j 6= i randomizes her invest-
ment trigger according to a distribution G with density g. Firm i's expected payoﬀ from investing
at a threshold Yi ≥ YS is∫ ∞
YS
V (Yi, s)g(s)ds =
∫ Yi
YS
F (s)g(s)ds+
∫ ∞
Yi
M(Yi)g(s)ds
=
∫ Yi
YS
F (s)g(s)ds+ (1−G(s))M(Yi).
36
Firm i is willing to mix over investment thresholds if ∂
(∫∞
YS
V (Yi, s)g(s)ds
)
/∂Yi = 0 over (YS ,∞),
that is if G is such that [F (Y )−M(Y )] g (Y ) = −M ′(Y ) [1−G (Y )] for all Y ∈ (YS ,∞). As the
same condition holds for the other by symmetry the equilibrium distribution satisﬁes
Ga (Y ) = 1− exp
∫ Y
YS
M ′(s)
F (s)−M(s)ds
so substituting for F and M the equilibrium distribution is
Ga (Y ) =
 0 , Y < YS1− ( YYS )β II−K exp{−β II−K ( YYS − 1)} , Y ≥ YS .
K˜ < K < K̂ case As L (Y ) < F (Y ) for all Y ﬁrms engage in a war of attrition but since
L (Y ) is decreasing over (YL, YS′), constant over [YS′ , YS ] and decreasing over (YS ,∞) the war
of attrition has a nonstandard form, where YS′ denotes the unique solution in [YL, YF ] to the
condition L (Y ) = M (YS).
The support of mixed strategies follows from an argument similar to above. Any threshold
Yi ∈ (y, YL) is a strictly dominated strategy and no player puts positive probability on YL in a
symmetric equilibrium. Similarly investing at any threshold Yi ∈ (YS′ , YS) is strictly dominated by
investing at YS and no player invests with positive probability at YS in a symmetric equilibrium.
Investment thresholds are therefore continuously distributed over [YLYS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞).
Letting Gb and gb denote the unconditional equilibrium distribution and density assume
that ﬁrm j 6= i randomizes her investment trigger. Firm i is indiﬀerent between investment
thresholds if ∂
(∫∞
YS
V (Yi, s)gb(s)ds
)
/∂Yi = 0 over [YL, YS′ ] ∪ [YS ,∞), that is if Gb is such that
[F (Y )− L(Y )] gb (Yi) = −L′(Y ) [1−Gb (Y )] for all Y ∈ (YLYS′) and [F (Y )−M(Y )] gb (Y ) =
−M ′(Y ) [1−Gb (Y )] for all Y ∈ (YS ,∞). The former condition holds for
Ga′ (Y ) = 1− exp
∫ Y
YL
L′(s)
F (YF )− L(s)ds
=
L (YL)− L (Y )
F (YF )− L (Y )
while the latter condition is satisﬁed by Ga so that the equilibrium distribution is
Gb (Y ) =

0 if Y < YL
Ga′ (Y ) if YL ≤ Y ≤ YS′
Ga′ (YS′) if YS′ < Y < YS
Ga′ (YS′) + (1−Ga′ (YS′))Ga (Y ) if Y ≥ YS
.
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A.3.2 Part (ii)
As discussed in the text and illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 there are two subcases to consider in
order to establish this part of the proposition. It is simpler to begin with the more standard case
I ≤ K before considering the case K̂ < K < I.
I ≤ K case ForK ≥ I, L (YF ) ≥ F (YF ) so that there exists a unique YP < YF such that L (Y ) =
F (Y ). Over (YP , YF ), the preemption range, L (Y ) > F (Y ). Following standard arguments over
this range ﬁrms seek to enter before the rival and in equilibrium both ﬁrms invest at YP which,
by the tie-breaking rule, results in either ﬁrm investing at YP with equal probability.
In preemption models, joint investment equilibria may also arise and it must be veriﬁed that
this is not the case here. Investment at the optimal simultaneous investment threshold YS by both
ﬁrms results in a payoﬀ M (YS) and evaluating the ratio of payoﬀs,
V (YL, YS)
V (YS , YS)
=
L (YL)
M (YS)
=
(
piM
piD
)β
− β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
I
K
)β−1
.
This ratio is increasing in K and therefore bounded below by its value at K̂ (over the range
of investment costs for which preemption occurs). Substituting K̂ for K and simplifying gives
L (YL) /M (YS) =
(
I/K̂
)(β−1)
> 1. The best response to Yj = YS is thus YL for all K > K̂ and
simultaneous investment is not an equilibrium.
K̂ < K < I case For K̂ < K < I, the condition L (Y ) = F (Y ) has two roots YP , YP ′ with
YP < YL and YP ′ ∈ (YL, YF ). For a given Y > YP ′ and any Yj , V (Y, Yj) ≤ F (YF ) so playing
beyond the preemption range (YP , YP ′) is a dominated strategy. Over the preemption range
(YP , YP ′) ﬁrms preempt one another as in case 3 above and in equilibrium both ﬁrms invest at YP
which by the tie-breaking rule results in either ﬁrm investing at YP with equal probability.
A.3.3 Part (iii)
If K = K̂, then any Yi = YL and Yj ≥ YL constitute an equilibrium as players are indiﬀerent
between the resulting leader and follower roles (L (YL) = F (YL)), and of these equilibria only
(YL, YL) is symmetric. 
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A.4 Corollary 2
To establish the comparative statics results the eﬀects of piM/piD and β and on K̂ need to be
determined. Evaluating the relevant partial derivatives and rearranging yields
∂K̂
∂ (piM/piD)
= −β
piM
piD
− 1
piM
piD
(
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
))K̂ (14)
after rearrangement so ∂K̂/∂ (piM/piD) < 0 directly, whereas
∂K̂
∂β
=− ln
1+β((piM/piD)−1)
(piM/piD)
β
(β − 1)2 +
1
β − 1
(
piM
piD
)β(
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
))
(
piM
piD
− 1
)(
piM
piD
)β − (1 + β (piMpiD − 1))(piMpiD )β ln piMpiD[(
piM
piD
)β]2
 K̂
=
−1
(β − 1)2
(
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
− (β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
)
K̂. (15)
The sign of ∂K̂/∂β is the opposite of that of the (bracketed) middle term. Applying the logarithm
inequality lnx > (x− 1) /x for x > 0, x 6= 1 with x = (1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) / (piM/piD) yields
ln
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)
piM/piD
>
(β − 1) ((piM/piD)− 1)
1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1) (16)
so ∂K̂/∂β < 0 and therefore ∂K̂/∂α, ∂K̂/∂σ > 0.
A.5 Extended mixed strategies and dynamic representation of the timing
game
Suppose that the feasible ﬁrm investment strategies are taken to consist of investment times
that are ﬁrst-hitting times τ (Yi) := inf {t ≥ 0 |Yt ≥ Yi } consistently with the idea that managers
determine optimal hurdle rates for investment at any point in time. Then the investment game is
quasi-deterministic in nature in the sense that there is a one-to-one mapping between distributions
of investment times and threshold strategies. We can then apply the framework of Fudenberg and
Tirole [11] directly by deﬁning extended mixed strategies over investment thresholds rather than
time, even though the underlying demand process is stochastic.17
17A more general dynamic representation allows for ﬁrms to choose arbitrary stopping times (see notably Riedel
and Steg [29]) which renders the investment game more complex. In the framework we adopt for instance, the
investment game remains in the attrition region once it has been initially attained whereas otherwise the demand
process exits the attrition regions with positive probability over any time interval.
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A.5.1 Strategies, payoﬀs and equilibrium deﬁnitions
In a dynamic representation of the investment game the continuation payoﬀs are deﬁned in terms of
the current state of the stochastic process y, and accordingly denoted Ly (Y ), F y (Y ) and My(Y ),
by setting
Ly (Y ) =
{
L (Y ) if Y < y
L (y) if Y ≥ y ,
and similarly for F y (Y ) and My(Y ).
Following Fudenberg and Tirole, a simple strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} in the game starting in
state y is a pair of real-valued functions (Gyi , α
y
i ) : [y,∞)× [y,∞)→ [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that (a) Gyi
is non-decreasing and right-continuous, (b) αyi (Y ) > 0⇒ Gyi (Y ) = 1, (c) αyi is right-diﬀerentiable
and (d) if αyi (Y ) = 0 and Y = inf {Z ≥ Y, αyi (Z) > 0} then αyi has positive right-derivative at Y .
Let Gy−i (Y ) := limZ→Y − G
y
i (Z) denote the left-hand limit of G
y
i , a
y
i (Y ) = G
y
i (Y )−Gy−i (Y )
the magnitude of any jump at Y and let Gy−i (Y ) = 0, i = 1, 2. Let Yi (y) = ∞ if αyi (Y ) = 0
for all Y ≥ y and Yi (y) = inf {Z ≥ y, αyi (Z) > 0} otherwise, and let Y (y) = min {Y1 (y) ,Y2 (y)}
denote the ﬁrst threshold at which an investment is certain to occur. Finally let
µL(u, v) :=
u(1− v)
u+ v − uv and µM (u, v) :=
uv
u+ v − uv .
Firm payoﬀs can then be expressed as
V y
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
=∫ Y(y)−
y
(
Ly (s)
(
1−Gyj (s)
)
dGyi (s) + F
y (s) (1−Gyi (s)) dGyj (s)
)
+
∑
Z<Y(y)
ayi (Z) a
y
j (Z)M
y(Z)

+
(
1−Gy−i (Y (y))
)(
1−Gy−j (Y (y))
)
WY(y)
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
,
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j where
W Y
(
(Gyi , α
y
i ) ,
(
Gyj , α
y
j
))
=
ay−j (Y )
1−Gy−j (Y )
((1− αyi (Y ))F y (Y ) + αyi (Y )My(Y ))+
1−Gyj (Y )
1−Gy−j (Y )
Ly (Y )
if Yi (y) < Yj (y),
=
ay−i (Y )
1−Gy−i (Y )
((
1− αyj (Y )
)
Ly (Y ) + αyj (Y )M
y(Y )
)
+
1−Gyi (Y )
1−Gy−i (Y )
F y (Y )
40
if Yi (y) > Yj (y) and
=

My(Y ) , ayi (Y ) = a
y
j (Y ) = 1
µL(a
y
i (Y ), a
y
j (Y ))L
y (Y ) + µyL(a
y
j (Y ), a
y
i (Y ))F
y (Y )
+µyM (a
y
i (Y ), a
y
j (Y ))M
y (Y )
, 0 < ayi (Y ) + a
y
j (Y ) < 2
(ayi (Y ))
′
Ly(Y )+(ayj (Y ))
′
F y(Y )
(ayi (Y ))
′
+(ayj (Y ))
′ , a
y
i (Y ) + a
y
j (Y ) = 0
if Yi (y) = Yj (y).
For a given y a pair of simple strategies ((Gy1, α
y
1) , (G
y
2, α
y
2)) is a Nash equilibrium of the
game ({1, 2} , (Gy1, αy1)× (Gy2, αy2) , (V y, V y)) if (Gyi , αyi ) maximizes V y (·, (Gyi , αyi )), i, j ∈ {1, 2},
i 6= j. A collection of simple strategies ((Gyi (Y ) , αyi (Y )))y>0 is said to be consistent if for y ≤
Y ≤ Z, Gyi (Z) = Gyi (Y ) + (1−Gyi (Y ))GYi (Z) and αyi (Z) = αYi (Z). The consistent strategies
((Gy1 (Y ) , α
y
1 (Y )))y>0 and ((G
y
2 (Y ) , α
y
2 (Y )))y>0 are a perfect equilibrium if the simple strategies
(Gy1 (Y ) , α
y
1 (Y )) and (G
y
2 (Y ) , α
y
2 (Y )) are a Nash equilibrium for every y.
A.5.2 Equilibrium
K < K̂ case In the attrition range ﬁrms do not proﬁt from using mixed strategies extensions
(αyi > 0) to coordinate simultaneous investments in a waiting game. Equilibrium strategies are
therefore essentially derived from the unconditional strategies Ga(Y ) and Gb(Y ) depending upon
whether K ≤ K̂ or K˜ < K < K̂. Therefore, letting Gya(Y ) := Ga(Y )−Ga(y)1−Ga(y) and G
y
b (Y ) :=
Gb(Y )−Gb(y)
1−Gb(y) , (G
y
i (Y ) , α
y
i (Y )) = (G
y
a(Y ), 0) and (G
y
i (Y ) , α
y
i (Y )) =
(
Gyb (Y ), 0
)
are equilibrium
strategies in these two subcases respectively.
K > K̂ case In the preemption range there are two subcases that we consider successively.
K̂ < K < I subcase This is the case represented in Figure 3 whose key features are that the
preemption range (over which Ly(Y ) > F y(Y )) is the bounded open interval (YP , YP ′) ⊂ (YP , YF ),
and that if a threshold beyond this range is reached (oﬀ the equilibrium path), ﬁrms play a waiting
game as F y(Y ) > Ly(Y ) for Y > YP ′ . In a dynamic representation of the game equilibrium
strategies must account explicitly for this possibility.
At any y > YP ′ the payoﬀ to leading lies below the follower payoﬀ, but it is not monotonic.
In (YP ′ , YF ) there exists a unique threshold YS′ such that L
y (YS′) = L
y (YS). The leader payoﬀ is
decreasing only over (YP ′ , YS′)∪(YS ,∞), and it is this range that constitutes the support of mixed
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strategies. The attrition subgame is then solved similarly to the K̂ < K < K˜ case in Section A.3
yielding unconditional distributions
Gc (Y ) = 1− exp
∫ Y
YP ′
[Ly(s)]′
F (max {Y, YF })− Ly(s)ds
and
Gd (Y ) =

0 if Y < Yp′
Gc (Y ) if YP ′ ≤ Y ≤ YS′
Gc (YS′) if YS′ < Y < YS
Gc (YS′) + (1−Gc (YS′))Ga (Y ) if Y ≥ YS
so that the conditional distribution is Gyd(Y ) :=
Gd(Y )−Gd(y)
1−Gd(y) .
If y lies in the preemption range the reasoning is standard and results in ﬁrms investing
immediately and using the strategy extensions to coordinate simultaneous investment.
To summarize equilibrium strategies in this case are (Gyi (Y ), α
y
i (Y )) with
Gyi (Y ) =

0 if Y < YP
1 if YP ≤ Y < YP ′
Gyd(Y ) if Y ≥ YP ′
,
αyi (Y ) =

0 if Y < YP
Ly(Y )−F y(Y )
Ly(Y )−My(Y ) if YP ≤ Y < YP ′
0 if Y ≥ YP ′
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
K ≥ I subcase Here Ly(Y ) > F y(Y ) over (YP , YF ) so the investment game is a standard
case of preemption over this range. A speciﬁcity of the investment game studied here is that for
K > I,My lies strictly above F y over [YF ,∞). Equilibrium strategies are thus those of a standard
real option game, yielding (Gyi (Y ), α
y
i (Y )) with
Gyi (Y ) =
{
0 if Y < YP
1 if Y ≥ YP
,
αyi (Y ) =

0 if Y < YP
Ly(Y )−F y(Y )
Ly(Y )−My(Y ) if YP ≤ Y < YF
1 if Y ≥ YF
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
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A.6 Imitation cost, consumer surplus, and welfare (Proposition 3)
The proof of Proposition 3 involves several steps. First, to establish (iii) by determining the
optimal imitation cost level KP in the closure of the preemption regime (for K ≥ K̂). Next we
prove part (ii) by showing that W (K) is increasing over [0, K˜). Finally for part (i) we establish
the existence of a local optimum of welfare under attrition (K˜ ≤ KA < K̂) and compare optimal
welfare in the attrition and preemption regimes.
Optimal imitation cost KP
Suppose that K ≥ K̂ so investment thresholds are YP and YF . The social welfare function (8)
then has the form
W (K) =
(
piM + CSM
r − α YP − I
)(
y
YP
)β
+
(
(2piD + CSD)− (piM + CSM )
r − α YF −K
)(
y
YF
)β
.
(18)
Noting that YP and YF are functions of K with YP ≤ YL and limK→K̂ YP = YL. Using the
preemption equilibrium condition L (YP ) = F (YF ) and implicit diﬀerentiation to obtain a useful
expression for the ratio (YF /YP )
β , after several steps of calculations (see Section A.9), for K > K̂
the derivative of welfare can be expressed
W ′(K) =
(
CSM
piM
(
β
piM
piD
+
(
β
piM
piD
− (β − 1)
)
YL
YL − YP
)
− βCSD
piD
− 2
)(
y
YF
)β
.
If CSM = 0, the YL and YP terms vanish and it is straightforward to see that W
′(K) < 0 so that
K̂ is a maximum in this case. Otherwise CSM > 0 and the behavior of W (K) for K > K̂ can
be characterized as follows. Since lim
K→K̂+ YP = YL, we have limK→K̂W
′(K) = +∞. Moreover
both (YL/ (YL − YP )) and (y/YF ) are decreasing in K so W is concave over this range. So long
as limK→∞W ′(K) < 0 therefore, there exists a unique root KP > K̂ that constitutes an interior
optimum, and as limK→∞ YP = (r − α) I/piM = ((β − 1) /β)YL, this occurs if(
β2
piM
piD
− (β − 1)2
)
CSM
piM
− βCSD
piD
− 2 < 0. (19)
If (19) does not hold, setKP =∞. Taken as a function of β the left-hand side of (19) is a quadratic
∆ (β), with ∆ (1) = (CSM − CSD − 2piD) /piD < 0 and lim∞∆ (β) =∞. Therefore there exists a
unique β0 > 1 such that ∆ (β0) = 0.
To summarize, we have so far characterized solutions to the constrained optimization problem
max
K≥K̂W (K) and shown that there is a unique optimum KP in the extended real line and there
exists a unique β0 > 1 such that KP is ﬁnite if and only if β < β0.
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Next, several steps of calculation (again see Section A.9 for details) establish that if the imita-
tion cost is set at KP , the corresponding (optimum) preemption threshold has the form Y
∗
P = ψYL
where
ψ =

CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2
β
CSD
piD
−β−1
β
CSM
piM
+ 2
β
, β < β0
β
β−1 , β ≥ β0
We have ψ ∈
[
β−1
β , 1
]
with ψ = 1 if CSM = 0 and ψ = (β − 1) /β if β ≥ β0, establishing part
(iii).
Note that the optimal preemption threshold Y ∗P satisﬁes Y
∗
P ∈ [YNPV, YL] where YNPV :=
(r − α) I/piM is the myopic Marshallian investment trigger. The optimal level of welfare under
preemption can be shown to be
W (KP ) =
CSM
piM
ψ1−β
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
Y0
YL
)β
and this latter expression is useful later in the proof of Proposition 4.
Lower bound on socially optimal imitation cost
If K < K˜, ﬁrms randomize investment triggers over [YS ,∞) according to the distribution
Ga (Y ) and imitator entry is immediate. Observe ﬁrst that by Proposition 2 industry value is lower
at any K than at K̂, so it is suﬃcient to show that the expected consumer surplus for K < K˜
is bounded above by its value at K̂ as well. The lower bound of the entry threshold distribution
under attrition in this case is YS = (β (r − α) I) / ((β − 1)piD), whereas at K̂ innovator and
imitator entry both occur earlier, at the thresholds YL and ŶF :=
(
β (r − α) K̂
)
/ ((β − 1)piD).
Therefore, both investments occur later under this type of attrition regime resulting in lower
consumer surplus and K < K˜ cannot be a social optimum.
Existence of local optimum under attrition and comparison
Finally consider the behavior of W (K) just to the left of K̂. Since EV
(
Y˜1, Y˜2
)
is maximized
at K̂, the value of lim
K→K̂−W
′(K) depends only on the left derivatives of the consumer surplus
terms at K̂. Consider ﬁrst the derivative of the third term, consumer surplus from imitation.
Developing it yields
CSD − CSM
r − α [YF ]
−(β−1) yβ
 G∧ (YS′ ;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
lagged imitator entry
+
∫ ∞
YS
(YF /s)
β−1 dG∧(s;K)︸ ︷︷ ︸

immediate imitator entry
.
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To determine the value of the left derivative at K̂ of this expression recall that the distribution of
entry thresholds is by G∧ (Y ;K) = 1 − (1−Gb (Y ))2. Since Gb
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1, G∧
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
= 1
and moreover ∂G∧/∂Y = 2 (1−Gb) (∂Gb/∂Y ), ∂G∧
(
YS′ ; K̂
)
/∂K
∣∣∣ = 0. Only the direct eﬀect
of K on YF therefore remains at K̂, and Similar reasoning holds for the consumer surplus from
innovation term in (8) (except that the is no direct eﬀect since YL is independent of K). Therefore,
lim
K→K̂−
W ′(K) = −βCSD − CSM
piD
Y −βF y
β ∂YF
∂K
≤ 0.
As W is continuous we conclude that if CSD > CSM there exists a local optimum imitation cost
level KA in
(
K˜, K̂
)
.
As lim
K→K̂− dW (K) /dK < 0 for CSD > CSM and limK→K̂+ dW (K) /dK > 0 for CSM > 0
we conclude that for (CSD − CSM ) CSM > 0 welfare has local maxima in both the (upper) attrition
and preemption ranges. Either type of local maximum can be a global maximum depending on
the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus resulting from innovation and imitation, which
establishes part (i). 
A.7 Suﬃcient condition for preemption to be optimal (Proposition 4)
The result is established by ﬁrst deriving an upper bound for the level of welfare realized in the
attrition regime, which is then compared with the lower bound of the welfare obtained under
preemption so as to obtain a tractable suﬃcient condition.
Upper bound for welfare under attrition
Under attrition, innovation and imitation occur at thresholds Y˜A and Y˜F = min
{
Y˜A, YF
}
so
the expected social welfare (8) is
W (K) = E
(
CSM + piM
r − α Y˜A − I
)(
y
Y˜A
)β
+ E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
y
Y˜F
)β
.
The term in the ﬁrst summand is quasiconcave in the investment threshold with a maximum at
(β (r − α) I) /((β − 1)(CSM + piM )) ≤ YL whereas given the support of the attrition distribution
Y˜A ≥ YL. Therefore
E
(
CSM + piM
r − α Y˜A − I
)(
y
Y˜A
)β
≤
(
CSM + piM
r − α YL − I
)(
y
YL
)β
≤
(
β
CSM
piM
+ 1
)
I
β − 1
(
y
YL
)β
. (20)
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The second summand can be bounded using the assumption that the static entry incentive is
excessive,
E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
y
Y˜F
)β
≤ E
(
piD
r − αY˜F −K
)(
y
Y˜F
)β
.
The term on the right-hand side is the expected follower payoﬀ in equilibrium, EF
(
Y˜F
)
. More-
over in equilibrium payoﬀs are constant over the support of mixed strategies so EF
(
Y˜F
)
=
max {L (YL) , L (YS)}, and this latter term is maximized for K = K̂ by Proposition 2. Therefore
E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
y
Y˜F
)β
≤ K̂
β − 1
(
y
ŶF
)β
where ŶF :=
(
β (r − α) K̂
)
/((β − 1)piD)) =
(
K̂/I
)
(piM/piD)YL. Using (12) to substitute for(
K̂/I
)−(β−1)
gives
E
(
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
r − α Y˜F −K
)(
y
Y˜F
)β
≤ 1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) I
β − 1
(
y
YL
)β
. (21)
Combining (20) and (21) yields
W (K) ≤
βCSM
piM
+ 1 +
1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
)
 I
β − 1
(
y
YL
)β
for K ≤ K̂.
Comparison of attrition and preemption welfare
The optimal value of expected welfare under preemption is
W (KP ) =
CSM
piM
1
ψβ−1 − ψβ
I
β − 1
(
y
YL
)β
(see Section A.9). Preemption is therefore socially optimal if
CSM
piM
(
1
ψβ−1 − ψβ − β
)
≥ 1 + 1
1 + β
(
piM
piD
− 1
) . (22)
This condition is diﬃcult to interpret however since ψ is itself a function of parameters including
CSD and piD. We therefore derive a conservative (it is only tight in the limit as β → 1) but more
tractable bound.
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Taken as a function of ψ over (0, 1), 1/
(
ψβ−1 − ψβ) is a strictly convex function that is
minimized at ψ0 := (β − 1) /β. Substituting this value into the left-hand side of (22) and using
1/ (1 + β ((piM/piD)− 1)) ≤ 1 yields after rearranging the stronger suﬃcient condition
CSM
piM
≥ 2
β
1(
β
β−1
)β−1 − 1 =: Ω (β) . (23)
The right-hand side of (23) can be characterized, ﬁrst by observing that by l'Hôpital's rule,
limβ→1
(
β
β−1
)β−1
= 1 and limβ→∞
(
β
β−1
)β−1
= e so limβ→1 Ω (1) = ∞ and limβ→∞Ω (β) = 0.
Moreover, 2/β is decreasing and d
[
(β/ (β − 1))β−1
]
/dβ =
[
(β/ (β − 1))β−1
]
(− (1/β) + ln (β/ (β − 1)))
which is positive since ln (β/ (β − 1)) > 1/β by the logarithm inequality. Therefore Ω′ (β) < 0. 
A.8 Buyout and licensing
Buyouts and attrition
To verify the claim that attrition does not occur if piM/piD ≥ β + 1 suppose that K = 0
(the imitation cost most favorable for attrition). The leader payoﬀ LB (Y ) is maximized at the
threshold YB = (β (r − α) I) /((β − 1)(piM − piD)). The investment game is (weakly) preemptive
if LB (YB) ≥ F (YB), that is if(
piM − piD
r − α YB − I
)(
y
YB
)β
≥ piD
r − αYB
(
y
YB
)β
which yields the desired condition.
Proposition 6
We ﬁrst verify that a buyout is the preferred instrument. The condition LB (Y ) ≥ LL (Y )
works out to(
piM − piD
r − α max {Y, YF } −KI
)(
y
max {Y, YF }
)β
≥
(
piD
r − α max {Y, YF } −K0 −KI
)(
y
max {Y, YF }
)β
which holds because of the eﬃciency eﬀect piM > 2piD.
That buyouts increase ﬁrm proﬁt for K < K̂ follows from LB (Y ) > L(Y ) and the rent
dissipation property of attrition and preemption.
Similarly, licensing (providedKI > 0) increases ﬁrm proﬁt while leaving the timing of imitation
unchanged. It therefore remains to verify that licensing results in earlier innovation. Let K̂L < K̂
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denote the critical threshold that separates attrition and preemption in the presence of licensing,
which solves LL (YL) = F (YF ) (as licensing only has a level eﬀect on the leader payoﬀ for Y < YF
the payoﬀ LL is maximized at YL). For K ≥ K̂L, as LL (Y ) > L(Y ) allowing licensing results
in innovation at a threshold that is either lower than the preemption threshold without licensing
or weakly lower than the previous possible innovation thresholds. Otherwise if K < K̂L, the
industry is in an attrition regime both with and without licensing and the distribution of innovation
thresholds shifts left with licensing. 
A.9 Additional derivations
This section details some of the lengthier derivations necessary to determine KP and YP (the
optimal imitation cost and preemption threshold within the extended preemption range) and
W (KP ) (the optimal welfare under extended preemption).
Characterization of YP and dYP /dK
The condition L (YP ) = F (YF ) implicitly deﬁnes the preemption threshold YP as a C1 function
of K over
(
K̂,∞
)
(see Section A.2). Dividing by yβ and grouping YF yields the more compact
form of this condition,(
piM
r − αYP − I
)
Y −βP =
(
piM
r − αYF −K
)
Y −βF
=
(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)(
β − 1
β
piD
r − α
)β
K−(β−1). (24)
This condition has the form f (YP ) = g (K), so that dYP /dK = g
′(K)/f ′(YP ) where
f ′ (YP ) =
(
− (β − 1) piM
r − αYP + βI
)
Y −β−1P
and
g′ (K) = −β − 1
K
g (K) < 0.
Any preemption threshold YP satisﬁes YP < YL, so f
′ (YP ) > 0. Finally, using the identity
g(K) = f (YP ) and developing yields
dYP
dK
= −YP − YNPV
YL − YP
(
YP
K
)
.
Interior preemption optimum KP
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Suppose that condition (19) holds so that the preemption optimum is known to be an interior
solution. To derive its explicit form, ﬁrst substitute YF in the social welfare function (18) to get
W (K) =
(
CSM + piM
r − α YP − I
)(
y
YP
)β
+
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β − 1
β
piD
r − α
)β
yβK−(β−1).
Consider then the problem max
K≥K̂W (K). We have
W ′ (K) =
(
− (β − 1) CSM + piM
r − α YP + βI
)(
y
YP
)β 1
YP
dYP
dK
−
(
β
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− (β − 1)
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
yβK−β .
At an interior optimum the socially optimal imitation costKP satisﬁes the conditionW
′
P (KP ) = 0
but it is convenient to obtain an expression for the socially optimal preemption threshold Y ∗P
instead.
Substituting for dYP /dK and normalizing the ﬁrst-order condition yields(
(β − 1) CSM + piM
r − α Y
∗
P − βI
)
Y ∗P − YNPV
YL − Y ∗P
[Y ∗P ]
−β
−
(
β
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− (β − 1)
)(
β
β − 1
r − α
piD
)−β
K
−(β−1)
P = 0
and substituting the preemption condition (24) gives a condition in Y ∗P only,(
(β − 1) CSM + piM
r − α Y
∗
P − βI
)
Y ∗P − YNPV
YL − Y ∗P
−
(
β
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− (β − 1)
) piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 = 0.
Noting that Y ∗P − YNPV = r−αpiM
(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
and rearranging then gives
(
CSM + piM
piM
Y ∗P − YL
)(
β
β − 1
piM
piD
− 1
)
= (YL − Y ∗P )
(
β
β − 1
(CSD + 2piD)− (CSM + piM )
piD
− 1
)
.
There is a unique solution to this condition which can be expressed as Y ∗P = ψYL where
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ψ =
CSD−CSM
piD
+ 2β
CSD
piD
− β−1β CSMpiM + 2β
.
Note that the condition Y ∗P > YNPV is equivalent to ψ > (β − 1) /β which yields condition (19) in
the text.
Value of optimal welfare under preemption W (KP )
The optimal social welfare can now be evaluated as follows. Using (24) to substitute in the
expression for W (KP ) above yields
WP (KP ) =(
CSM+piM
r−α Y
∗
P − I
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
)
+
(
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
)(
piM
r−αY
∗
P − I
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
(
y
Y ∗P
)β
.
Substituting for Y ∗P = (β (r − α)ψI) / ((β − 1)piM ) (= ψYL) and factoring I,
WP (KP ) =(
β
β−1
CSM+piM
piM
ψ − 1
)(
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1
)
+
(
β
β−1
(CSD+2piD)−(CSM+piM )
piD
− 1
)(
β
β−1ψ − 1
)
β
β−1
piM
piD
− 1 ψ
−βI
(
y
YL
)β
.
Then after substituting the expression for ψ and some algebra,
WP (KP ) =
CSM
piM
ψ−(β−1)
1− ψ
I
β − 1
(
y
YL
)β
.

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